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Does  the Evidence Favor State
Competition in Corporate Law?
Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell
In the ongoing debate on state competition over corporate charters,
supporters of state competition have long claimed that the empirical evi-
dence clearly supports their view.  This Article suggests that the body  of
empirical evidence on  which supporters of state competition have relied
does not warrant  this claim. This empirical evidence, the authors show, is
in fact entirely consistent with  the opposing view that state competition
provides undesirable incentives with  respect to  some  corporate issues,
such as takeover regulation,  that substantially affect corporate managers'
private interests.
The authors  first demonstrate that reported  findings of a  positive cor-
relation between  incorporation in Delaware and increased shareholder
wealth are not robust and,  furthermore, do not establish causation. Sec-
ond, the authors show that, even if Delaware incorporation  were found to
cause an increase in shareholder  value, this finding would not imply that
state competition is working well; benefits to incorporating  in the domi-
nant state would likely exist in a "race toward the bottom " equilibrium in
which state competition provided undesirable incentives. Third, the  au-
thors point out that empirical  claims that state competition rewards mod-
eration in the provision of antitakeover  protections are not well grounded.
Finally, the authors endorse a new approach to the empirical  study of the
subject that is based on analyzing the determinants of companies' choices
of state of incorporation.  Recent work based on  this approach indicates
that, contrary to the  beliefs of state-competition supporters, states that
amass antitakeover  statutes are more successful in the incorporation  mar-
ket. The authors' analysis calls for a reconsideration  of established  posi-
tions concerning the merits and consequences of regulatory competition
(as currently  structured)  in corporate  law.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most central  and enduring  debates in corporate law schol-
arship concerns  the role of states in the regulation of corporations.  Simply
put, what are the costs and benefits of allowing a firm, through its incorpo-
ration decision, to select which state's corporate law governs its activities?
The modem debate on the subject, which began with William Cary's attack
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on state  competition as  fostering  a "race  to the  bottom,"'  has produced  a
voluminous  literature.2  The debate has had remarkable  resiliency; in recent
years there has been a burst of writing by legal academics  weighing  in on
the  subject.3  Nor  is  interest  any  longer  confined  to  U.S.  academics;
European policymakers now face the pressing question of how to allocate
regulatory authority between the institutions of the European Union and its
member national governments in the area of corporate law.4
The dominant view among  corporate law scholars  has been the  "race
to  the top"  school  of thought.  Its supporters contend  that the competition
among states over attracting incorporations  benefits shareholders.5 On their
view, Delaware,  the dominant state for incorporations, has "won"  the race
for incorporations  by being the most virtuous, that is, by offering rules that
maximize  shareholder  wealth.  Indeed,  one  prominent  "race  to  the  top"
theorist has referred to state competition as the "genius  of American corpo-
rate law."6
1.  William L. Cary, Federalism  and Corporate  Law: Reflections Upon Delavare,  83 YALE L.J.
663  (1974).
2.  See,  e.g.,  FRANK  H.  EASTERBROOK  &  DANIEL R.  FISCHEL,  THE  ECONOMIC  STRUCTURE  OF
CORPORATE  LAW  1-40  (1991);  ROBERTA  ROMANO,  THE  GENIUS  OF  AMERICAN  CORPORATE  LAW
(1993)  [hereinafter  ROMANO,  GENIUS];  Lucian A.  Bebchuk,  Federalism and the Corporation: The
Desirable Limits on State Competition in  Corporate  Lav,  105 HARV.  L.  REV.  1435  (1992);  Roberta
Romano, Lav as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation  Puzzle, 1  J.L.  ECON. & ORG.  225  (1985)
[hereinafter Romano, Lav as a Product];  Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder  Protection,  and
the Theory of  the Corporation,  6 J. LEGAL STUD.  251 (1977).
3.  See,  e.g.,  Lucian  A.  Bebchuk  &  Allen  Ferrell,  A  New Approach to  Takeover Lav  and
Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REV.  111 (2001)  [hereinafter Bebehuk & Ferrell, A New Approach];
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federal  Intervention to Enhance Shareholder  Choice, 87 VA.  L.
REV.  993  (2001)  [hereinafter Bebchuk  & Ferrell, Federal  Intervention];  Lucian  A. Bebchuk & Allen
Ferrell, Federalism  and Corporate  Law:  The Race to Protect  Managers  from Takeovers, 99 COLUM.  L.
REv.  1168  (1999)  [hereinafter  Bebehuk & Ferrell, Federalism  and Corporate  Law]; Sanjai Bhagat  &
Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law-Part  II:  Empirical Studies of Corporate Law, 4 AM.  L.
&  ECON.  REV.  380 (2002);  Stephen  Choi  & Andrew  Guzman,  Choice and Federal Intervention in
Corporate  Law, 87 VA. L. REV.  961  (2001); Robert Daines, Does Delavare  Law Improve Firm Value?,
62  J.  FIN.  ECON.  525  (2001);  Jill  E.  Fisch,  The  Peculiar Role  of the  Delavare Courts in the
Competition  for Corporate Charters,  68 U. CIN.  L. REV.  1061  (2000); Marcel  Kahan & Ehud Kamar,
Price Discrimination in  the Market for Corporate Law,  86  CORNELL  L.  REV.  1205  (2001);  Ehud
Kamar,  A  Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law,  98  COLUM.  L.  REV.
1908  (1998);  Leo E.  Strine, Jr., Delaware's Corporate-Law  System:  Is Corporate  America Buying an
Exquisite Jewel or Diamond in the Rough? A  Response to Kahan & Kamar's  Price  Discrimination  in
the Market  for Corporate  Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV.  1257 (2001).
4.  Two  events  have recently brought these  issues  to the  forefront.  The  first is the  potentially
sweeping  decision  of the European Court of Justice  in the  Centros case on  which country's  corporate
law governs a  firm. Case  C-212/97,  Centros Ltd.  v. Erhverus - og Selskabstyrelsen, 2  C.M.L.R.  551
(1999).  The  second  is  the  recent  rejection  of a  proposed  European  Union  directive  on  takeover
regulation.  See  Proposal  for  a  13th  European  Parliament  and  Council  Directive  on Company  Law
Concerning  Takeover  Bids,  at  http://europa.eu.intlprelex/detail-dossier-real.cfin?CL=en&DosId
=11887 (last visited Nov.  12, 2002).
5.  For further details on this position, see Winter, supra note 2;  ROMANO,  GENIUS, supra note 2;
EASTERBROOK &  FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE,  supra  note 2.
6.  ROMANO, GENIUS,  supra note 2.
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The  view  that  state  competition  works  well  rests  on  two  proposi-
tions:  (1)  that states  actively  and vigorously compete  for incorporations,
and  (2)  that the ensuing competitive threat provides the dominant state of
Delaware,  as  well  as  other  states,  with  powerful  incentives  to  provide
value-enhancing  rules.  Even  those  skeptical  of  state  competition  have
largely  not  questioned  the  first  proposition-that  states  compete  vigor-
ously. The debate has thus focused on the second proposition-concerning
the quality of incentives-and this Article will focus on it as well.
In questioning the quality of incentives provided by competition,  crit-
ics have argued that the competitive threat might push states in undesirable
directions with respect to some important corporate law issues. This view,
to  which  we  subscribe,  holds  that state  competition  does  not  work well
with respect to some (but not all) important corporate  law issues.7  On this
view, state competition  induces states to provide rules  that managers,  but
not necessarily shareholders, favor with respect to corporate law issues that
significantly  affect  managers'  private  benefits  of control,  such  as  rules
governing takeovers. It has also been suggested that state competition leads
Delaware  to  offer  an  excessively  unpredictable  body  of law that  creates
unnecessary litigation.'
To  shed  light  on  this  debate,  researchers  have  undertaken  a  large
number of empirical studies. The authors of these studies, as well as corpo-
rate law scholars who have used the studies in their own work, have gener-
ally  interpreted  the  empirical  findings  as  supporting  the race-to-the-top
view. Indeed, supporters  of state competition have seized on these studies
as  strong-nay,  decisive---evidence  that  state  competition  serves  share-
holder  interests.  For example,  Roberta  Romano  has  concluded  that  the
findings  of the empirical  work "are  compelling  evidence that competition
benefits  shareholders." 9 On a similar note,  Frank Easterbrook  and Daniel
Fischel  .have  stated:  "Empirical  studies  confirm[  ]  the  force  of
competition....  These  findings  fatally  undermine  [the  'race  to  the
bottom'] position ....  0
7.  See Bebchuk, supra note 2; Bebchuk & Ferrell, Federalism  and Corporate  Law, supra note
3; Bebchuk  &  Ferrell,  A  New Approach, supra note 3;  OREN  BAR-GILL  ET  AL.,  THE  MARKET  FOR
CORPORATE  LAw (Harv. John M. Olin Center for L., Econ.,  & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 377, 2002);
cf. Cary, supra note 1.
8.  See Kamar, supra note  3, at 1927-39;  cf.  Jonathan  R. Macey  & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward
an Interest-Group  Theory of  Delaware Corporate  Law,  65 Tx. L. REv. 469 (1987).
9.  Roberta  Romano,  The  Need for  Competition  in International Securities Regulation,  2
THEORETICAL  INQUIRIES  IN  L.  1,  113  (2001),  at http://www.bepress.com/til/default/vol2/iss2/artl.
Professor Romano  has  expressed  similar views  in other papers.  See  Roberta  Romano,  Empowering
Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107  YALE  L.J.  2359,  2384  (1998)  ("The
empirical research on state competition undermines the race-for-the-bottom  argument ..  "); Bhagat &
Romano, supra  note 3,  at 384 ("One certainly cannot read the event study literature and conclude that
firms reincorporating are reducing their shareholders'  wealth as [critics of the "race to the top" theory]
contend[ ].").
10.  EASTERBROOK &  FISCHEL, supra  note 2, at 214-15.
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This Article challenges this assessment of the evidence. We argue that
the conclusions  supporters of state competition have  drawn  from the  em-
pirical  evidence are unjustified. The existing  evidence does not fatally un-
dermine  the  criticisms  of  state  competition,  but  rather  leaves  them
unscathed.  Further,  evidence  generated  by  a new  empirical  approach  to
evaluating  state  competition  indicates  that  competition  rewards  and  en-
courages the amassing of antitakeover statutes by states. This new evidence
calls  into question state-competition  supporters'  belief that state  competi-
tion does not push states to adopt antitakeover statutes.
The skeptical account of state competition, which we will demonstrate
is consistent with the empirical  evidence,  is as follows:  Because managers
have substantial  influence  over where  companies  are incorporated,  a state
that  wishes  to  maximize  the number of corporations  chartered  in it  will
have to take  into account the interests of managers. As a result, state com-
petition pushes states to give significant weight to managerial interests.
Of course,  catering to managerial  interests  is only problematic  when
the  interests  of shareholders  and managers  substantially  diverge.  Thus,  in
our view, state competition will likely fail shareholders  with respect to is-
sues that are "significantly redistributive"  in that they involve  a significant
trade-off between important managerial and shareholder interests.  One area
where  such  a divergence  of interests  is  likely  to be  particularly  acute  is
takeover regulation.  Managers  interested  in preserving  their jobs and pri-
vate benefits of control  will tend to  favor restrictive takeover rules, what-
ever the costs to shareholders.
Does the existing empirical  evidence contradict this skeptical account,
as  so many  claim? Part I examines  the significant body of empirical  work
that  has  sought  to  determine  the  effects  of Delaware  incorporation  on
shareholder  value. This  work includes  a recent cross-sectional  study sug-
gesting that shareholder value is higher  for Delaware  companies  than for
non-Delaware  companies  as well  as reincorporation  event  studies indicat-
ing  that reincorporations  to  Delaware  were  accompanied  by  increases  in
stock price.
A  close  examination  of the  findings  of both  types  of studies  shows
that, taken as  a whole, they do not establish a robust and significant corre-
lation between Delaware incorporation  and higher shareholder wealth. Fur-
thermore,  even assuming that a robust and  significant correlation between
Delaware  incorporation  and  somewhat higher shareholder value  were pre-
sent, supporters of state competition have failed to distinguish satisfactorily
between correlation and causation. The correlation of Delaware  incorpora-
tion  and  higher  stock  value  would  not  necessarily  imply  causation  of
higher stock value by Delaware  incorporation. The selection of firms  that
incorporate in Delaware, either initially or mid-stream, is not random.
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Firms electing to incorporate  in Delaware  and firms not making such
elections must differ in some way that accounts for their different incorpo-
ration decisions. Any stock price effects  correlated with Delaware incorpo-
ration  may  very  well  be  due  not  to  the  direct  effects  of  Delaware
incorporation  but rather to these underlying  differences  among  firms.  In-
deed, we show that there is  evidence that selection effects  are likely to be
very much at work and that inferences about the relative value of Delaware
law cannot be reliably made from existing findings on correlations between
Delaware incorporation and shareholder value.
Although  we  conclude  in Part  I  that the  existing  evidence  fails  to
demonstrate  that Delaware  incorporation  increases  shareholder  value,  we
do believe that it is reasonable  to  assume that Delaware  incorporation  on
average benefits investors,  even if in a rather small and limited way. How-
ever, as  Part II explains,  a marginal  superiority of Delaware incorporation
for shareholder value  does not imply that  state competition  (as  currently
structured) benefits investors. Indeed,  the presence of such  a marginal su-
periority would be consistent with our skeptical  account of state competi-
tion.1
On our view, the incentive to cater to managerial interests, and in par-
ticular to protect managers  excessively from takeovers,  exists  in all states
that wish to  attract  incorporations.  Consequently,  all such  states  will  be
pushed towards privileging managers'  interests over shareholders'  interests
when  the  two  conflict.  In such  an  equilibrium,  Delaware  incorporation
might still provide  some benefits  to  shareholders  due to Delaware's  well
developed  legal  infrastructure  and to network  externalities.  Nevertheless,
the overall corporate regimes that states adopt would be adversely  shaped
by state competition.
The critical question to resolve,  as Part II will emphasize,  is whether
the existing state competition equilibrium is superior to the set of corporate
rules that would prevail in the quite different equilibrium that would obtain
in the  absence  of the  current  form  of state  competition.  This  question
should not be confused,  as  supporters  of state  competition  seem to have
done, with the question of whether Delaware is somewhat better than other
states in the existing state competition equilibrium.
Part III turns from these general considerations  to the concrete case of
state takeover regulation and what it can tell us about how state  competi-
tion works in an important area of corporate law. State takeover regulation
presents  state competition  supporters with a dilemma. The dilemma stems
from the fact that many  state competition  supporters believe that existing
state  takeover  law  restricts  corporate  takeovers  excessively.  Supporters
have therefore been forced to reconcile this belief with their view that state
11.  This point is formally demonstrated in a model  developed in OREN  BAR-GILL  ET  AL.,  supra
note 7.
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competition produces desirable corporate law. To this end, they have made
empirical  claims that state competition has not contributed to the prolifera-
tion of antitakeover statutes but rather rewarded those states that have been
comparatively  moderate. Delaware,  by far the most successful state  in the
incorporation marketplace,  is usually cited as the paradigm of a state with a
"moderate"  takeover regime.
Part III shows, however, that the empirical claims made by supporters
of state competition fail to establish that state competition rewards modera-
tion in the provision of antitakeover protections. First,  although Delaware
does  not go  as far  as some states that have adopted  extreme antitakeover
statutes,  it  is  far  from  clear  that Delaware  is  more  moderate  than  most
states  in its  antitakeover  stance.  Second, the  studies  of states  that  have
adopted  extreme  antitakeover  statutes  (Massachusetts,"  Ohio, 3  and
Pennsylvania 4) do indicate that the adoption of these statutes has been det-
rimental to  shareholder value,  but they do  not show that the incorporation
marketplace  has  penalized  these  three  states by  reducing  the number  of
incorporations  in them.  Whether these  states have in fact been harmed or
benefited by their  adoption of extreme  antitakeover protections  in the in-
corporation marketplace is a question Part IV addresses.
Part IV proposes a promising new approach to the empirical investiga-
tion  of state  competition.  We  argue  that  researchers  and  corporate  law
scholars  should  seek to  identify the  determinants  of firms'  incorporation
choices.  Whereas  prior  work has  largely  taken  incorporation  choices  as
given, and has  sought to  identify how those incorporation decisions  were
associated with shareholder  value, the proposed approach attempts to iden-
tify  the  factors  that  determine  incorporation  decisions  in  the first place.
Furthermore,  whereas prior work has largely ignored the considerable  vari-
ance  among  states  other than Delaware  with respect to  success  in the in-
corporation  market,  we  argue  that this variance  can be used  to  examine
how differences  in state corporate law regimes  affect firms'  incorporation
decisions.
Part IV presents  some summary statistics  and basic  cross-state  com-
parisons that illustrate the value of this approach. Part IV also summarizes
and  discusses  the  findings  of  a  separate  study  by  two  of  us  (the
12.  MASS.  GEN.  LAWS  ANN.  ch.  156B,  §  50A  (2002);  see also  GRANT  GARTMAN,  STATE
ANTITAKEOVER  LAWS:  MASSACHUSETTS-2  TO  MASSACHUSETTS-3  (Investor  Responsibility  Research
Center 2000).
13.  OHIO  REV.  CODE  ANN.  §  1707.043  (Anderson 2002); see GARTMAN,  supra note  12,  OHIo-2
TO OHIO-3.
14.  15  PA.  CONS.  STAT.  §§  2571-2575 (2002); see GARTMAN,  supra note  12, PENNSYLVANIA-2
TO PENNSYLVANIA-3.
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Incorporation  Study) which carried out a full empirical  analysis based on
this approach.15
As  will be described in more detail below, the analysis of incorpora-
tion decisions  reveals that the competition for  incorporations  does in fact
reward the amassing  of antitakeover protections. At one  end of the  spec-
trum,  states  with  no  antitakeover  statutes,  such  as  California,  do  quite
poorly, retaining a relatively small fraction of the companies headquartered
in them  and attracting  a small  or even  negligible  number of out-of-state
companies. At the other end of the spectrum, states that are quite successful
on these two dimensions  are typically  ones that have amassed most if not
all of the standard antitakeover statutes. In general, the success of a state in
the market for incorporations  increases  as its level of antitakeover protec-
tion increases  (controlling, of course,  for company characteristics  and for
the characteristics of states other than their takeover laws).
Interestingly,  the evidence  does not show that the incorporation mar-
ket  penalizes  states  that  have  adopted  extreme  antitakeover  statutes,  as
Massachusetts,  Ohio,  and Pennsylvania have done. Although the adoption
of these  statutes  was universally  criticized  and accompanied by  a signifi-
cant  reduction  in  the  stock  value  of  corporations  incorporated  in  these
states, these states have not suffered in the incorporation market. We do not
doubt  that  there  is  some  level  of extreme  antitakeover  protection  that
would "over-do it" and make a state adopting it less attractive to incorpora-
tors.  However,  in contrast to the  beliefs  of state  competition  supporters,
this  level  has  apparently not been  reached  by Massachusetts,  Ohio,  and
Pennsylvania, the three states blacklisted by scholars as extreme.
The  study  of the  determinants  of incorporation  decisions  can  thus
shed a more systematic light on the connection between  state competition
and takeover rules. Competition appears to reward, and thus encourage, the
amassing  of antitakeover  statutes.  It  is therefore  difficult  to maintain,  as
many  supporters of state competition  have done,  both that  (1)  state com-
petition generally rewards  the provision of rules  that enhance  shareholder
value,  and  (2)  amassing  antitakeover  protections  will  restrict  takeovers
excessively and hurt shareholder  value. At least one of these two proposi-
tions is in need of revision.
The Article  concludes that, in contrast  to the strongly held beliefs of
race-to-the-top  scholars,  the  evidence  is  consistent  with,  and  in  certain
ways  supports,  the skeptical  view of how  state competition,  as  currently
structured, performs with respect to important corporate law subjects.  This
15.  See Lucian  Bebchuk  &  Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions Where  to  Incorporate, 46 J.L.  &
EcoN.  (forthcoming Oct. 2003). For another contemporaneous  study which applies this  approach, and
whose  results  we  discuss,  see  Guhan  Subramanian,  The Influence  of Antitakeover Statutes  on
Incorporation  Choice: Evidence on the "'Race"  Debate andAntitakeover  Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 1795  (2002).
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conclusion has  significant  implications  for the ongoing  debates  regarding
state competition, corporate governance, and state takeover law.
Before  proceeding,  we wish  to  note  an additional  reason-which  is
outside the scope of this Article's analysis-for questioning the empirical
basis of the view supporting state competition. As noted, whereas we focus
here on the proposition that competition provides desirable incentives,  an-
other key proposition underlying the race-to-the-top  view is that states vig-
orously  compete  for  corporate  charters.  In  a  companion  work,  we  put
forward empirical evidence  questioning this premise  as well. The Incorpo-
ration Study indicates that competition is highly imperfect in that Delaware
faces scant competition  in the market for out-of-state incorporations;  firms
largely incorporate either in Delaware or in the state of their headquarters.' 6
Building on this finding, a companion work by Assaf Hamdani and one  of
us provides evidence that Delaware's  dominance of the incorporation mar-
ket is stronger and more  secure than has been recognized,  and it then dis-
cusses  how  this  feature  of the  incorporation  market  casts  doubt  on  the
extent to which this market can be relied on to produce  rules that enhance
shareholder  value. 7  This  work  complements  the  analysis  of this  Article
and reinforces its message-that the existing evidence does not support the
views of state-competition advocates.
I
DOES DELAWARE INCORPORATION  INCREASE  SHAREHOLDER  VALUE?
Researchers  have tried to  test whether Delaware  corporate  law is su-
perior  by  identifying  how,  compared  with  firms  incorporated  in  other
states,  incorporation  in Delaware  affects  stock price, Tobin's Q,18 or some
other metric associated with shareholder wealth.  We begin our examination
of these studies by discussing,  in Part I.A,  Robert Daines's influential  pa-
per  measuring  and  comparing  the  Tobin's  Q  of  Delaware  and  non-
Delaware  firms.  Part  I.B  will  then look  at  reincorporation  event  studies,
which measure  stock price  reaction  to  a firm's reincorporation  from  one
state to another. We will show that the findings of some of these studies are
weaker and less  conclusive than has been generally recognized.  More  im-
portantly,  both  the  reincorporation  event  studies  and  Daines's  Tobin's Q
study fail  to  establish  that their  findings  of increased  value for Delaware
firms, whatever the metric being used, should be  attributed to  Delaware's
provision of a superior corporate law system. It is crucial in assessing these
16.  See Bebchuck & Cohen, supra  note  15.
17.  See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani,  Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:  Reconsidering
the Debate on State  Competition in Corporate  Lav,  11  YALE  L.J. (forthcoming  Dec.  2002).  An
empirical analysis that complements  this work is offered by Marcel Kahan  and Ehud Kamar,  The Myth
of  State Competition in Corporate  Lav, 55 STAN.  L. REV. (forthcoming 2002).
18.  See RICHARD  A.  BREALEY  &  STEWART C.  MYERS,  PRINCIPLES OF  CORPORATE FINANCE  775-
76 (5th ed.  1996) (explaining Tobin's Q).
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studies to remember  that  incorporation  and reincorporation  decisions  are
not random; there is thus no good basis for inferring that the measured dif-
ferences in shareholder wealth are due to differences in corporate law qual-
ity as opposed to whatever influences  firms' (re)incorporation decisions.
A.  Tobin's Q Differences Between Delaware  and  Non-Delaware
Corporations
Recognizing  the  limitations  of reincorporation  event  studies,  which
we will discuss in the next Section, Robert Daines sought to test the effect
of Delaware  incorporation  on shareholder  wealth in a different way.  In a
recent  but  already  influential  study,  he  compared  Delaware  and  non-
Delaware  companies in terms of Tobin's Q.1 9 Tobin's Q, which is the ratio
between a firm's market value and its book value, is a widely used measure
of how valuable  a firm's assets  are  in relation  to  their replacement  cost.
Looking  at  the  aggregate  data  from  1981  to  1996,  Daines  found  that
Delaware  companies  had a higher Tobin's  Q even after controlling  for  a
variety of factors. He inferred from this finding that Delaware law accounts
for the higher Tobin's Q and, therefore, acts to increase shareholder value.
Daimes's findings  have received  a great deal  of attention20  and have
been put forward by supporters of state competition as strong evidence  for
their  view.2'  As  explained  below, however,  subsequent  work has  shown
that the reported  correlation  between Tobin's  Q and Delaware  incorpora-
tion no longer exists. Furthermore, the evidence about the existence of such
a correlation in the past does not tell us whether such a correlation was due
to a selection effect rather than to the beneficial effects  of Delaware incor-
poration.
1.  The Current  Nonexistence of Correlation
Work done  subsequent  to  Daines's  study  indicates  that the reported
correlation no longer exists. The Incorporation Study, examining data from
the end of 1999, found that there was no correlation between Delaware in-
corporation  and higher  Tobin's  Q  at  the  end of  1999.22  Another  recent
study, by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, using a set of controls that includes
firm-level corporate  governance arrangements, found that during the  1990s
19.  See Daines, supra  note 3.
20.  See,  e.g.,  Steven  Lipin,  Firms Incorporated in Delaware Are  Valued More  by Investors,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2000, at C21.
21.  See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Displacing  Delavare: Can the Feds Do a Better  Job Than the
States in Regulating Takeovers? 57 Bus. LAw. 1025  (2002) (relying on Daines's findings to oppose  a
proposal by Bebchuk and Ferrell for choice-enhancing  federal intervention).
22.  See Bebehuck & Cohen, supra  note  15.
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Delaware  incorporation was,  on average, associated  with  a lower Tobin's
Q.
23
Furthermore,  in a working paper focusing on the correlation between
Tobin's Q  and  Delaware  incorporation,  Guhan Subramanian  finds that no
correlation between a higher Tobin's Q and Delaware incorporation existed
in  any  of the  years  1996-2001.24  Subramanian  improves  upon  Daires's
testing methodology  in several  ways and provides  a thorough  and careful
testing of the Tobin's  Q question. While  his results  confirm the  existence
of a correlation between  Tobin's Q and Delaware incorporation during the
years  1991-1996,  they indicate  that such correlation  does not exist in  any
of the years after 1996, which is when Daines's study ended.
Interestingly,  the  single-year  regressions  in Daines's  study  indicate
that a positive correlation between  higher Tobin's  Q and Delaware  incor-
poration did not exist in five years (1982,  1987,  1989,  1991,  1995)  during
the period studied;25 in an additional year (1996),  the statistical significance
of the correlation was only at a 90% level.26 Subramanian reexamines three
of these years (1991,  1995, and  1996)  and finds that the correlation did ex-
ist in two of them but did not for the other one.27
In any event, whether  or not the correlation  existed in all of the years
during the period  covered by Daines's  study, for our purposes  the crucial
point is that such a correlation does not exist at the present time. This fact
should give supporters of state competition some pause. If the existence  of
the correlation was viewed by them as an indication that competition works
well, shouldn't  the nonexistence of such  a correlation  now lead to doubts
as to whether competition is working as well at the present time?
2.  The Fluctuations  of the "Delaware  Effect"
An assessment of Daines's findings should take into account the fluc-
tuations  in the size of the Delaware  effect. An examination  of his results
indicates that the magnitude of the correlation varied  greatly from year to
year. For instance, Daines's regressions  indicate that Delaware  companies
had a Tobin's Q in  1986  that was  12%  higher (at a 99%  confidence level)
than  that  of  non-Delaware  companies.  In  the  subsequent  year,  1987,
23.  See PAUL  A. GOMPERS  ET AL.,  CORPORATE  GOVERNANCE  AND  EQUITY  PRICEs (Nat'l Bureau
of  Econ. Res.,  Working  Paper  No.  8449,  2001).  Specifically,  they find that Delaware  incorporation
tended  to be positively  correlated  at the beginning of the studied period and negative  toward the end,
with an average coefficient  that was negative and statistically significant.  Id
24.  See  Guhan  Subramanian,  The  Disappearing  Delaware  Effect  (Sept.  2002)  (unpublished
working paper, on file with authors).
25.  See Daines, Delaware  Law, supra note 3, at 535.
26.  The  same basic  picture emerges  if one uses Tobin's  Q unadjusted  by industry. There were
four  years  in which there  was  no statistically significant  correlation  between Delaware  incorporation
and  (an unadjusted)  Tobin's  Q  and  one  additional  year  in which  the  statistical  significance  of the
correlation was only at a 90% level.  Daimes, supra  note 3.
27.  See Subramanian, supra  note 24.
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however, the increase in Tobin's Q associated with Delaware incorporation
was only  5%, which was statistically insignificant  from zero. To  take an-
other example, in  1991  the increase in Tobin's Q associated with Delaware
incorporation was 4%, also not statistically significant from zero, while in
1992, that figure suddenly increased to 12%  (at a 99% confidence level).28
Such  large  fluctuations  from year  to year  are deeply puzzling if one
takes  the  view  that  differences  in  value  between  Delaware  and  non-
Delaware  companies  are  the result of the benefits  of Delaware  law.  For
Daines's  attribution of the differences  in Tobin's  Q to the superiority  of
Delaware's  corporate  law  regime  to be plausible,  there  must have been
ground-breaking  legal  changes  in Delaware  corporate  law  that occurred
during  these  years  that  can  account  for  these  fluctuations.  It  is  hard  to
imagine what these dramatic changes could have been. Whatever the bene-
fits of Delaware's  legal  regime  and thus  of Delaware incorporation,  they
must be more stable than that.
In  his  working  paper  recreating  Daines's  analysis,  using  different
specifications  for  some  key  variables,  Subramanian  obtains  results  in
which the Delaware effect does not fluctuate wildly from year to year but
still changes significantly  over time.29  He finds that, while Delaware firms
were worth 2-3%  more during the period from  1991  to  1996  (3%  in 1991-
1993  and  2%  in  1994-1996),  there  was  no  statistically  significant
difference  between  Delaware  and  non-Delaware  firms  from  1997  on.
Subramanian  seeks to  explain the change  in the value  of Delaware  firms
between  1996  and 1997 by a growing perception in the market, caused by
three  cases  in  which  Delaware  firms  fended  off hostile  bidders,  that
Delaware  would allow target management  to "just say no" to hostile bids.
Subramanian  acknowledges  that  the permissibility  of "just say no"  was
largely  established by Delaware  law several  years earlier and that the bid-
ders  in  the  three  cases  on  which  he  relies  did  not  even  try  to  get  the
Delaware  courts  to  order poison pill redemption.  But he  conjectures  that
these three cases might have made the permissibility of "just say no" under
Delaware  law more  salient. It is  far from  clear, however, that such a sali-
ency  story  can account  for a 2%  decline  in the value  of Delaware  firms
from 1996 to 1997.
The fluctuations in the Delaware effect, whether from year to year or
from period to period, might be due to a selection effect. According to this
explanation,  Delaware  companies  differ  significantly  from non-Delaware
firms in some underlying way-they are of a different "type." And it is not
unusual  in the  stock market  for the relative pricing of firms of different
types to fluctuate considerably from year to year. This possibility brings us
to the general problem of selection.
28.  Daines,  supra note 3, at 535 tbl. 3.
29.  See  Subramanian, supra note 24.
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3.  The Problem of  Selection
There  might be some who, upon finding that the correlation between
Tobin's  Q  and  Delaware  incorporation  no  longer  exists,  might  want to
move  on to other pieces  of the empirical  evidence. It is worthwhile,  how-
ever, to  examine whether the existence  of correlation in some past periods
(even if not now) indicates  that Delaware  incorporation  did produce  sig-
nificant  increases in value  for shareholders.  To draw such an inference,  it
would  be  necessary  to  determine  whether  the  relationship  between
Delaware  incorporation  and  a higher  Tobin's  Q  (or a positive  abnormal
price reaction in the case  of reincorporation event studies)  is one of causa-
tion or mere correlation.  In other words, did Delaware law cause Delaware
firms to have a higher Tobin's Q or did companies choosing to incorporate
in Delaware tend to have a higher Tobin's Q?
If incorporation and reincorporation decisions were random, and if we
could therefore safely assume that Delaware and non-Delaware  firms were
identical other than in their state of incorporation, differences  in Tobin's Q
would  arguably  be attributable  to  Delaware's  superior  corporate  law  re-
gime.  But if incorporation decisions  were not random, then the differences
in Tobin's  Q could have resulted from the systematic differences  between
firms  that incorporated  in Delaware  and those that did not. Below we dis-
cuss why incorporation decisions should not be regarded as random.
a.  Selection Follows  from the Very Presence of a Delaware  Wealth Effect
If there were any period in which Delaware incorporation could bring
about an increase in shareholder value, it would follow that Delaware  and
non-Delaware  firms  differed in systematic ways  other than in their state of
incorporation. Consider  a period in which  a move to Delaware  could have
produced, say, a 3%  or 5%  increase in value for companies incorporated in
other states."  Why did some firms choose to leave  so much money on the
table,  money they could easily  have collected by simply (re)incorporating
in Delaware?  There must have been something different about these firms.
The difference might have been in managerial quality,  or agency costs, or
firm strategy.  Whatever  it was, this difference  must have been significant
enough to cause non-reincorporating firms to forgo  an easy and significant
increase  in  firm  value.  Once  differences  between  Delaware  and  non-
Delaware  firms are admitted, however, there is a real possibility that they,
rather than  the purported  benefits  of Delaware  incorporation,  account  for
whatever differences  in value  existed, at any given point in time, between
Delaware and non-Delaware  companies.
30.  Five percent is the estimate provided by Daines's study for the value-added  of Delaware law
given the pooled sample estimates. See Daines, supra note  3, at 535 tbl. 3.  Subramanian estimates  that
Delaware firms were worth 2%-3% more during the period  1991-1996.  Subramanian, supra note 24.
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While  Daines's  study  makes  an  impressive  effort  to  control  for  as
many parameters  as possible,  including type  of business  and  firm size,  it
nonetheless  remains  true that  if in a group  of seemingly  identical  firms,
some firms incorporate  in Delaware and others do not, there must be omit-
ted variables  that produce  this  differential  behavior.  This  is all the more
true if it is supposed that one choice produces a substantial increase in firm
value and the other does not.
The presence  of such variables is  clearly  suggested by the results  of
the Incorporation  Study.3' Using  the Compustat  database that Daines also
used, this study  sought to  identify which characteristics  make  companies
more  or less likely to incorporate  in Delaware. It found, for example, that
larger  and newer  companies  are  more  likely  to  incorporate  in Delaware.
For our purposes, however, the crucial point is that the study's regressions,
controlling  for various  company  characteristics  (which Daines  also  con-
trolled for) had an explanatory  power of only 13%  for the decision whether
or not to  incorporate  in Delaware.3 2  This  finding clearly  suggests the  im-
portance of omitted variables  in explaining why some firms but not others
choose Delaware incorporation.33
b.  Understanding  Selection
There are various explanations  that could account for why firms with
the same  Compustat data  characteristics make different incorporation and
reincorporation  decisions.  Consider, for example, the following scenario. 34
Law  firms  centered in national  financial  centers  such as New  York City
might tend to prefer Delaware  incorporation. And companies that use such
31.  Bebchuck & Cohen, supra  note  15.
32.  Id.
33.  It is  worth  noting  another  interesting  attempt  by Daines  to  isolate  his  findings  from  the
selection effect. He estimates  the difference  in Tobin's  Q  only between  mature Delaware  and mature
non-Delaware  firms on the theory that a firm's current valuation is unrelated to its valuation years ago.
He  also  estimates  the  difference  in  Tobin's  Q  between  Delaware  and  non-Delaware  firms  while
controlling  for the prestige  of the  firm's underwriter  at the time of its  initial public offering  ("IPO"),
assuming  that this  prestige is  correlated  with  the  firm's  quality and value.  These tests  also  show a
correlation between Delaware incorporation and a higher Tobin's  Q.
But  these tests  do not  solve  the  selection effect problem  for  two reasons.  First, the finding that
otherwise  identical  firms,  as  indicated by their choice of an underwriter  or maturity, make different
choices on whether or not to incorporate in Delaware still raises the same type of questions. If  the firms
are really identical, one must ask what accounts  for the difference in incorporation  choices, unless one
believes  that  incorporation  choices  are  random.  And  why  are  underwriters  with  similar  prestige
sometimes associated with Delaware incorporations  and sometimes with non-Delaware incorporations,
which are value-reducing?
Second,  these tests cannot address  selection effects that occur after incorporation.  We know  that
some selection  among firms must  be occurring  because of the non-random  nature of reincorporation
decisions.  Controlling for decisions made at the time of incorporation does not control for the decisions
that have been made since that time with respect to whether or not to reincorporate. The current state of
incorporation  of the  firms whose Tobin's Qs are  being  measured will reflect  these post-incorporation
decisions.
34.  This scenario is suggested in Bebchuk & Ferrell, A New Approach, supra  note 3, at 137-38.
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law firms for their counsel might be persuaded or influenced to incorporate
in Delaware. It is possible that these companies may be more likely to have
sophisticated and ambitious  managers  or have  some other quality  that op-
erates to increase firm value.  Of course, this scenario, based on managerial
heterogeneity,  is only one of many possible stories that an examination  of
the  selection issue  should consider. The critical point is  that the different
incorporation  choices  of  firms  with  the  same  basic  financial  features-
some  of which incorporate  in Delaware  and  some  of which  do not-are
bound to reflect some other differences  between them, and the latter might
account  for  whatever  differences  in  shareholder  value  exist  between
Delaware and non-Delaware  firms.
Discovering what influences  companies'  incorporation decisions is an
area  in need of empirical  work. Until such  studies  are  available  and  we
know a great deal more about how firms make incorporation decisions, the
attribution of differences  in  firm value  to  differences  in corporate law  re-
gimes will remain questionable.
B.  Event Studies of  Reincorporations
A number of studies have examined stock price reaction to changes in
a firm's  state  of incorporation.  The  overwhelming  majority  of the  firms
examined by these studies,  as is true with reincorporating firms in general,
reincorporate  to  Delaware."  The  reincorporation  studies  are  by far  the
most commonly  cited evidence  for the proposition that Delaware corporate
law  increases  shareholder  wealth.  Such  studies,  for  instance,  provided
much  of the  basis  for the views  of Professors  Easterbrook,  Fischel,  and
Romano quoted earlier.36
What conclusions should we draw from these reincorporation studies?
Part I.B. 1 will emphasize that in answering this question one should bear in
mind the  flaws  in some of these  event  studies and the  fact that the  docu-
mented positive abnormal returns associated  with  reincorporations  are,  on
the whole, quite modest. Part I.B.2 will then argue that there is no firm ba-
sis for attributing these modest positive abnormal returns to the superiority
of Delaware's corporate law regime.
1.  The Abnormal Returns Findings: Questions of  Robustness and
Magnitude
There have been eight reincorporation  event studies.  Overall, the pic-
ture that  emerges  is  one of modest  gains accompanying  reincorporation.
Six  of  the  eight  studies  documented  positive  abnormal  stock  returns
35.  See Bhagat  & Romano, supra note  3, at 383; Romano,  Lav  as a Product, supra note  2,  at
244.
36.  See supra Introduction.
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associated  with the reincorporating  firms in the sample.37  The remaining
two  found  negative  abnormal  returns  associated  with  reincorpora-
tions:  One  found  negative  returns  associated  with  the  entire  sample, 3"
while  the other found negative returns  associated with a subgroup  of the
reincorporating  firms.39  Pooling  the  results  from  all  eight  studies,  the
weighted  average  price reaction  to reincorporation  is  +1.28%. 41 Even ac-
cepting this finding at face value, the positive abnormal return attributable
to Delaware's  superior corporate law regime is rather small. Before draw-
ing any firm conclusions, however, it is first worth taking a closer look at
these event studies.
The two earliest reincorporation event studies used problematic meth-
odologies that were subsequently viewed to be unreliable.  Six subsequent
studies used more  standard and reliable  methodologies. These six  studies,
37.  See Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani,  The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard  in
Corporate  Governance, 75 IowA  L. Rav. 1 (1989);  Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich,  The Market  for
Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competition"  Versus Federal Regulation, 53  J.  Bus.  259  (1980);
Allen  Hyman,  The Delavare Controversy-The Legal Debate, 4 J. CoRP.  LAw  368  (1979);  Jeffrey
Netter & Annette Poulsen,  State Corporation  Lavs and  Shareholders: The Recent Experience, 18 FIN.
MGhMT.  29  (1989);  Romano, Lav  as a Product, supra note  2;  Jianghong  Wang,  Performance  of
Reincorporating Firms (1995)  (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
38.  See Randall A. Heron & Wilbur G. Lewellen, An Empirical  Analysis of the Reincorporation
Decision,  33 J. FIN.  & QUANTITATIVE  ANALYSIS  549  (1998).
39.  See Pamela Peterson,  Reincorporation  Motives and Shareholder Wealth, 23  FIN.  REV.  151
(1988).
40.  Returns  are  weighted  by their  sample  size.  In taking  pooled  average  price  reactions,  we
follow John C.  Coates IV,  Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A  Critique of the Scientific
Evidence, 79 TEx. L. REv.  271,  283  (2000), and Michael  C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback,  The Market
for Corporate  Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5,  12-13 (1980).
41.  In the first study, Allen Hyman found positive abnormal returns for reincorporating firms for
four of the five trading days prior to the public announcement  of reincorporation.  Hyman, supra note
37.  But this  finding does  not tell us whether the positive abnormal  returns were associated with  the
reincorporation  announcement itself, which is the relevant date. Whether statistically abnormal returns
for the sample  occurred over a  period spanning the five days  before and  after the announcement day
itself is unreported. The study does not tell us whether  there were positive abnormal returns associated
with the period  spanning  one day immediately  before and  after the announcement  date, a  commonly
used time-frame for reincorporation  studies. These concerns  are  heightened by the fact that abnormal
returns were  determined  by reference  to the  performance  of Standard  & Poor's  S&P 500  index,  a
somewhat unorthodox, and unreliable, methodology.
The second reincorporation  event study, by Peter Dodd and Richard Leftwich, examined  a sample
of 140 publicly traded companies that reincorporated between  1927 and 1977. Dodd & Leftwich, supra
note  37. The study did find statistically significant positive abnormal  returns, but it used an interval of
two years  before the reincorporation  date.  Such an extended period sheds  little light  on  the effect of
reincorporation.  It is generally true that using an interval of a few days or weeks around an event, rather
than just the  day of the  event  itself, can  still do a good job  of capturing  the  effects  of the event.
However, this generalism is not true for a two-year interval. See, e.g., Brad M. Barber & John D. Lyon,
Detecting Long-Run  Abnormal Stock  Returns: The  Empirical Power  and Specification of  Test
Statistics, 43  J. FIN. ECON.  341,  342-43  (1997)  (also finding that long-run tests  are  nisspecified and
identifying  new listing bias, rebalancing  bias, and skewness bias as reasons); S.P. Kothari & Jerold B.
Warner, Measuring  Long-Horizon Security Price  Performance,  43 J. FIN. ECON.  301,  301,  337  (1997)
(finding  that  tests  of  multi-year  abnormal  returns  around  firm-specific  events  are  "severely
misspecified" and concluding that "the interpretation of  long-horizon tests requires extreme caution").
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summarized  in  the table below,  present a rather mixed  picture. 42  Roberta
Romano's  study, the  earliest and most influential of the six, found  a posi-
tive  abnormal  return  of 4.18%.4'  However,  three  of the  subsequent  five
studies found abnormal returns in the vicinity of 1%, and two of the subse-
quent  five  studies,  including  the most recent  event  study which used the
largest sample size, did not find an abnormal return that differed from zero
in a statistically significant way.
Authors  Abnormal Return  Sample Size
Romano (1985)  4.18%  150
Peterson  (1988)  .27%  30
Bradley & Schipani (1989)  1.04%  32
Netter & Poulsen (1989)  .93%  36
Wang (1995)  .97%  145
Heron & Lewellen (1998)  -.15%  294
Thus,  a 1% positive abnormal  return is probably as fair a measure  as
any if one were inclined to rely on these event studies to measure the effect
on stock price of reincorporation to a superior corporate law regime.'44 Ac-
cordingly, even if the positive abnormal stock price reaction is entirely due
to the benefits of Delaware incorporation, these benefits appear to be rather
modest.4 5 For instance,  the adoption  of confidential  voting, which is usu-
ally  not considered  a significant change, has  a reported  positive abnormal
return  of approximately  1%.6  But should one  attribute  the entire  positive
abnormal  return found in these event studies to the superiority of Delaware
incorporation?
2.  The Problem of Confounding Events
a.  Confounding  Events
If the subset of firms reincorporating  at any point in time were a ran-
dom selection  from the  universe  of all corporations,  it would  follow  that
unaccounted  for increases  in  a reincorporating  firm's stock  price  on  the
date the news  of reincorporation  reached  the market  could  reasonably be
attributed  to  Delaware's  superior  corporate  law.  The  randomness  of the
42.  See Bradley & Schipani, supra  note 37; Heron & Lewellen, supra note 38; Netter & Poulsen,
supra note  37; Peterson, supra note  39; Romano, Law as a Product, supra note  2; Wang,  supra note
37.
43.  See Romano, Law as a  Product,  supra note 2.
44.  The pooled weighted average abnormal return of these six studies is 1. 16%.
45.  We do recognize,  of course, that a 1% increase in firm value can still be  quite meaningful  in
terms  of  the  dollars  at stake.  We  point  out  the  size  of the abnormal  return  merely  to  place  it  in
perspective.
46.  Coates, supra note  40,  at 284 (pointing  out  that the  positive  abnormal  return of adopting
confidential  voting is .9234%).
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selection  would help  ensure  that firm-specific  characteristics were  not af-
fecting stock prices.
However,  there is good reason to believe  (as was also the  case when
considering  Daines's Tobin's  Q  study)  that reincorporation  decisions  are
not random, but rather are  associated with or produced by specific events
or  occurrences,  a phenomenon  we will refer to  as  "confounding  events."
As  a result,  any  findings  of positive  abnormal returns  could well  be the
result not of investors'  anticipation of moving to  a better legal regime but
rather of investors'  reactions to these confounding  events. The need to dis-
entangle  various  effects  is  a generic problem  that arises  with  the use  of
event  studies in the field of corporate  law, but its  importance  varies with
the context.47  In the context of corporate  reincorporations, the presence  of
confounding  events is an issue that must be confronted because reincorpo-
ration decisions are clearly not random. Only some firms elect to reincor-
porate, and they choose to  do so  at a particular point in time. Thus,  some
event, perhaps  the receipt of new  information  concerning  the corporation
or a new firm  strategy, must underlie the decision of the managers  of a mi-
nority of companies to pursue reincorporation to a particular state at a spe-
cific  point in time.  Investors  could  very well revise  their  estimates  of a
company's value in light of such an event, if the event is observable,  or in
light of the inference that such an event might have occurred, if the event is
not observable. Either way, reincorporations  are likely to be  accompanied
by investors revising their estimates of the value of reincorporating compa-
nies for reasons that have nothing to do with differences  in legal regimes.
Indeed, a close examination  of the reincorporation  event studies con-
firms that confounding  events  have a considerable  impact on documented
returns. Most of the studies indicate that reincorporations are the product of
significant  selection  effects  and  were  accompanied  by  certain  events
(which  could have  caused revised valuation)  or were  followed by  certain
events (and thus could have been viewed by investors  as signals that such
events might indeed follow). For example, in a well known study, Romano
found that "most reincorporations  preceded  or coincided  with a series  of
distinct  and  identifiable  transactions,"48  and  that  "the  most  plausible
explanation  of the reincorporation  phenomenon  is that corporations  plan-
ning to engage in specific activities consider the choice of domicile impor-
tant."49 Such findings are consistent with the view that reincorporations  are
not  random,  and  that  the returns  accompanying  reincorporations  reflect
47.  For instance, an important  issue in corporate finance  is the effectiveness  of event studies  in
identifying  the underlying sources of the gains that occur as a result of corporate  mergers. See Gregor
Andrade et al.,  Nev Evidence and  Perspectives  on Mergers, 15 J. ECON.  PERSP. 103,  117 (2001).
48.  See Romano, Lav as a Product, supra  note 2, at 250. Professor Romano reports that 72%  of
reincorporations  between  1960  and  1982  were  associated  either  with  a  public  offering  of stock,
mergers, or adoption of antitakeover defenses. ROMANO,  GENIUS, supra note 2, at 33.
49.  Romano, Law as a Product,  supra note 2, at 261.
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investors'  reactions to events that partly coincide with, and partly might be
inferred from, the reincorporation decisions.
Of Romano's sample of 150 reincorporations,  sixty-three were associ-
ated with an active merger and acquisitions  program by the firms in ques-
tion." 0  Such programs  are known to  be associated  with  positive abnormal
returns. 1  Below we  will  discuss  two  other  types  of confounding  events
stories that seem plausible in light of the evidence. Each one of them could
well have been present in some significant fraction of reincorporations  and
could explain why, even if firms do not on average benefit from moving to
Delaware's  legal regime, reincorporations  were accompanied by increases
in company  value.  The  following  list  of types  of confounding  events  is
meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive.
b.  Scheduling  Reincorporation  Votes in Relatively Good Times
Managers  interested  in reincorporation might well prefer bringing re-
incorporation proposals to  a shareholder vote when things are going well,
or at least not poorly, for the company. Managers are more likely to receive
shareholder  approval  for a proposal  if shareholders  are  content  with  the
company's  overall performance.  Managers,  who have a great deal of flexi-
bility  in terms  of when a reincorporation  proposal  will be brought  before
shareholders,  can  orchestrate,  at  least to  a significant  extent,  shareholder
votes to coincide with good times.
Thus,  it  might  be  that,  on  average,  managers  bring  reincorporation
proposals  to  shareholders  when  contemporaneous  news  about  the  com-
pany's  performance,  or news  expected  to  be released by  the  time of the
vote,  is better  than average.  Indeed, to produce  an  average  positive stock
price effect, it would be enough merely that managers avoid pursuing rein-
corporations  at  times when  particularly  bad news  about  the company  is
revealed.  In short, according to this explanation, reincorporations  may gen-
erally be  accompanied  by an upward revision in  investors'  valuations  be-
cause investors on average receive or expect to receive better than average
news.
The story that managers time reincorporation votes to take place when
things  are going better than average  sits well with  a pattern  established by
the reincorporation  event studies.  As Michael  Bradley and  Cindy Schipani
explain,  "firms  choose  to  reincorporate  in  Delaware  after  they  have
experienced an abnormal run-up in their stock price."52 Consistent with this
observation,  the  Dodd  and  Leftwich  reincorporation  event  study  found,
both for the entire  sample of reincorporating  firms as well  as for the group
50.  Id. at 268.
51.  See Katherine  Schipper  &  Rex  Thompson,  Evidence on  the  Capitalized Value of Merger
ActivityforAcquiring Firms, 11  J. FIN.  ECON. 85 (1983).
52.  Bradley & Schipani, supra note 37, at 67.
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of firms for which they had accurate reincorporation  announcement dates,
that most  of the  abnormal  returns  experienced  by reincorporating  firms
occurred  well before the event date. 3  The same finding was subsequently
reproduced  in  both  Romano's  1985  event  study54  and  Bradley  and
Schipani's  1989  event study."  This pattern is consistent with the view that
the reincorporation event studies  lump together abnormal  returns that lead
to or influence the timing of the reincorporation decision (and which could
well continue  to be present at the time  of the reincorporation  announce-
ment) with abnormal  returns  that should be attributed to the reincorpora-
tion announcement itself, shorn of any confounding events.
Furthermore,  the Heron and Lewellen reincorporation  event study re-
ports that a significant number of reincorporations  in the study's raw data
set  coincided  with  substantial  corporate  events  such  as  dividend  in-
creases.56  Whereas  Heron  and  Lewellen  excluded  these reincorporations
from the  sample they studied,  other studies57  did not similarly attempt to
exclude  companies that increased their dividends  (or had other coincident
events)  at the same  time that they announced  their plan to  reincorporate,
which might explain why these studies found higher positive abnormal re-
turns  associated  with  reincorporation  than  did  the  Heron  and  Lewellen
study.
c.  Increased  Likelihood of  Takeover
A second plausible  confounding  events  story centers  on takeover de-
fenses. As the reincorporation events studies indicate, a significant number
of reincorporations  are motivated by antitakeover considerations.  Reincor-
porating  companies  often candidly  admit that  antitakeover considerations
are a motive for seeking reincorporation.5"  When  investors  suspect or are
told  that  a  company  is  moving  for  such  reasons,  they  will  adjust  their
valuations  of the company to reflect not only  (1)  the direct  effect of the
company  being  subject  to  a  different  state  takeover  regime,  but
also  (2)  the increased probability,  inferred  from the managers'  focus  on
antitakeover considerations, of the company being a target.
The second factor, the increased probability of a takeover, is generally
received as good news by investors and can be expected to have a positive
effect on stock prices. Thus,  the presence  of this factor,  according  to this
explanation,  implies  that  the  reported  positive  abnormal  returns  docu-
mented  in  reincorporation  event  studies  represent  an  upward  biased
53.  Dodd & Leftwich, supra  note 37, at 272-78.
54.  Romano, Linv as a Product,  supra note 2, at 269-71.
55.  Bradley & Schipani, supra note 37, at 66-67.
56.  Heron & Lewellen, supra  note 38, at 553.
57.  See, e.g., Hyman, supra  note 37.
58.  See, e.g., Heron & Lewellen, supra note 38, at 553; Romano, Lav as a Product,  supra  note 2,
at 225,249-61.
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estimate  of the effect  of moving  companies  to  a  different  state  takeover
regime. Even if it were the  case  that the first factor (subjecting the  com-
pany to a different state takeover regime) has  a sufficiently  large negative
effect  on stock prices  so  that all the  antitakeover-motivated  reincorpora-
tions are accompanied by a negative abnormal return, this negative abnor-
mal return  would  still  be  an upward  biased  estimate  of the  lower return
caused by  the first factor  alone. And this upward bias  in the  documented
returns  for part of the reincorporation  sample  would,  of course,  increase
average results for the sample as a whole.
d.  Different Reincorporation  Categories
Consistent  with  the significance  of confounding  events,  two  recent
studies  found  that  the  abnormal  returns  experienced  by reincorporating
firms vary depending on the announced motivation for the firm's  decision
to  reincorporate.  Heron  and  Lewellen  found  that  reincorporations  moti-
vated by a desire  to erect takeover defenses  were accompanied by statisti-
cally significant negative  abnormal  returns. 9 In  contrast, reincorporations
motivated by  a  desire  to  limit directors'  liability  resulted in positive  ab-
normal  returns.6"  Peterson's  reincorporation  event study  also documented
that abnormal  returns differed depending  on the announced motivation for
reincorporation.61 If the motivation for the reincorporation was defensive in
nature,  the  abnormal  return  was  -.16%,  while  other  reincorporations  ex-
perienced a positive abnormal  return of .65%.62
Romano's  1985  study  broke  down  reincorporations  into  three
groups:  reincorporations  that seemed  motivated  by  mergers  and acquisi-
tion  programs;  reincorporations  that  seemed  motivated  by  antitakeover
considerations;  and a miscellaneous  group  consisting of all the remaining
reincorporations.  She  found that each  of the three  groups  had a substan-
tially different average  abnormal  return but that the variance of the  three
associated abnormal returns was not statistically significant.63
In recent papers, Sanjai Bhagat and Roberta Romano argue that, based
on Romano's  1985  study, confounding  events  do not influence the returns
reported  in the event studies  literature.'  Bhagat and Romano interpret the
lack of statistically significant differences  between the three groups as  evi-
dence  that  "significant  positive  returns  upon  reincorporation  can  be
59.  Heron & Lewellen, supra note 38, at 549-68.
60.  Id.  at 550, 557 tbl. 5.
61.  See Peterson, supra  note 39.
62.  See generally Bhagat  & Romano, supra note  3,  at 385  (discussing Peterson's study  along
with other event studies).
63.  Romano, Law as a Product,  supra note 2, at 272. Peterson's study, which also found different
abnormal  returns across subgroups  of reincorporating  firms, did not test the  statistical  significance of
the returns'  variance.
64.  See, e.g.,  Bhagat & Romano, supra  note 3, at 387.
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attributed  to investors'  positive assessment of the change in legal regime,
not  a  confounding  of the  impact  of reincorporating  firms'  other  future
projects."65 But this inference, which the  1985  study did not make, is un-
warranted.
To start, such an inference  would overlook the different conclusions
reached by more recent studies. Perhaps more importantly, Romano's  1985
testing was not designed to address the confounding  events issue. The test-
ing examined whether reincorporations  with different motivations  had dif-
ferent effects  on stock market values. Tests for confounding  events should
focus on all the information that was publicly known at the time of the re-
incorporation,  but the information  on which Romano's  1985  study relied
differed  from this  category  of information  in two  significant ways.  First,
Romano's analysis used for the classification information that was not pub-
licly known  at the time of the reincorporation, such  as information  about
acquisitions  in the year following the reincorporation  and information  dis-
closed to Romano  privately in response to the questionnaire  she circulated
to firms many years after their reincorporation.  Second, Romano's  analysis
did not include some public information  that would be relevant for study-
ing the confounding  events  question,  such  as how the earnings  and other
financial disclosures  of reincorporating companies at the time of their rein-
corporation compared with those of nonreincorporating companies.66
In sum, there are good reasons, grounded in the empirical  evidence, to
believe that reincorporations  are accompanied  by confounding  events that
can help explain the documented positive abnormal returns. What is lack-
ing in the literature to date is a better understanding of what causes firms to
incorporate at given times in particular jurisdictions. We will return to this
issue in Part IV.
II
DOES A MARGINAL  SUPERIORITY  OF DELAWARE  INCORPORATION  IMPLY
THAT STATE COMPETITION  BENEFITS  INVESTORS?
Part I  questioned  whether  the  available  empirical  evidence  demon-
strates  that Delaware's  legal regime  benefits  investors  more  than that of
other states.  In this Part, we change directions and assume that incorpora-
tion in Delaware does add some value, even if it is difficult to measure. It
65.  Id.; see also ROMANO,  GENIUS, supra note 2, at 18.
66.  It is also worth noting that the breakdown of reincorporating  firms  into groups in Romano's
1985  study  involved substantial "noise"  which  made it difficult  to get statistically significant  results.
Given that the breakdown into groups involved a great deal of noise (as the study itself readily admits),
the  1985  study  prudentially  emphasizes  that this  noise  "may  very well  be the source  of the test's
inability to find any significant  difference among the groups."  Romano, Law as a Product, supra  note
2,  at 272.  The  only  conclusion  that  the  1985  study  was  prepared  to  make  was  that  "[w]e  cannot
conclude  definitely  that the stock  returns for the  different types of reincorporations  are significantly
different." Id.
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is  reasonable  to  assume  that  reincorporation  often  adds  some  value;
otherwise,  shareholders  would tend not to vote to reincorporate.  But what
are the implications of such benefits for the merits of state competition?
Many  scholars have assumed, without much discussion, that the pres-
ence of benefits to  shareholders from Delaware  incorporation would prove
that  state  competition  benefits  investors.67  This  assumption  is  not  valid,
however. The relative performance  of Delaware in a state competition sys-
tem  and  the overall performance  of the  state competition  system  are two
separate  issues. Findings of Delaware  marginal  superiority do not address
the  question  of how  well state  competition  is performing  overall  and, in
particular,  whether  it  performs  better  than  would  an  alternative  regime.
And it is the performance  of the state competition regime  overall that is at
the heart of the debate surrounding state competition for corporate charters.
A.  The Need to Evaluate  States' Collective Performance
It  is  worthwhile  emphasizing  that,  in  many  respects,  the  various
states'  corporate regimes are not very different from each other when com-
pared against the range of possible choices and the laws of other countries.
This  feature of U.S.  corporate  law  has been well  documented in William
Camey's  comprehensive  study of state  corporate  law.68  The  similarity  is
especially noteworthy in light of the existence of fifty-one separate corpo-
rate codes and the resulting opportunity for a wide variety of approaches to
many corporate law issues.69
Given the fundamental  similarity among  state corporate law regimes,
assessing the collective approach that the states have adopted in most areas
of corporate regulation  is as  important in assessing the value of state  com-
petition  as evaluating  some of the real differences  (such as in the area of
takeover regulation) that do exist between states. This assessment of states'
collective approach should focus on those areas where there is a substantial
divergence  between  the  interests  of managers  and  shareholders.  It  is  in
these areas  that states, including Delaware,  are likely to collectively adopt
a suboptimal position.
67.  See supra  notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
68.  William  J.  Carney,  The Production of Corporate  Laiv,  71  S.  CAL.  L. REV.  715  (1998);  see
also John  C. Coffee,  Jr., The Future as History:  The Prospects  for Global Convergence of Corporate
Governance and  Its Implications,  93 Nw. U. L. REV.  641,  702 (1999)  ("[T]he best documented finding
in  the  empirical  literature  on  the  U.S.  corporate  chartering  competition  is  that  a  high  degree  of
uniformity has emerged in American corporate  laws.").
69.  For example,  despite the large number  of U.S. jurisdictions, none of them has offered,  as the
British City Code has done, a clear and categorical ban on the use of defensive tactics in the presence of
a  bona  fide  tender  offer  in  the  absence  of shareholder  approval.  See  2  P.F.C.  BEGG,  CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS AND  MERGERS:  A  PRACTICAL  GUIDE TO THE LEGAL,  FINANCIAL,  AND  ADMINISTRATIVE
IMPLICATIONS  (Graham & Trotman Limited,  1985).
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B.  A Skeptical Account of  State Competition Is Consistent  with Delaware
Marginal  Superiority
The  superiority  of Delaware's  legal  regime,  as  purportedly  docu-
mented  by the studies we reviewed  in Part I of this Article,  is consistent
with a pro-state competition position. But such a finding is equally consis-
tent  with  a  more  skeptical  theory  of how  state  competition  works  and,
therefore, is inconclusive  in adjudicating the debate over state competition.
Indeed, any account of state competition-whether  critical or supportive-
that takes into account the substantial uniformity among states in substan-
tive  arrangements,  would likely  start  from  the premise  that  Delaware's
corporate regime is marginally better. If all states have essentially the same
substantive rules, it is likely that Delaware's unique nonsubstantive  advan-
tages will outweigh any of the relatively small differences that exist among
states.  Delaware  is the beneficiary  of network externalities  and a well de-
veloped legal infrastructure.7"
For example, consider the following skeptical account of state compe-
tition. Just as shareholders presumably approve reincorporations  when they
increase  firm value, a decision by managers not to reincorporate, which is
not reviewable by shareholders  under state law, is presumably in the inter-
ests of managers. With respect to certain corporate  law subjects, there will
often  be a  substantial divergence  between the  interests  of managers  and
those  of shareholders.  In such  circumstances,  Delaware,  as well  as other
states,  will  care  a  great  deal  about  satisfying  managers'  preferences,  as
states will  wish to prevent managers  from pursuing reincorporation  else-
where.7 1
As we  have argued  in earlier work,  corporate  rules that are  signifi-
cantly redistributive from shareholders  to managers and rules that affect the
discipline  of the  market  are  likely  areas  where  states,  as  a result  of the
competition  for  corporate  charters,  will  fail  to  maximize  shareholder
wealth. The failure to maximize  shareholder wealth in these areas will be
true not only of Delaware but of other states as well. As a result, it would
be theoretically possible for there to be a competitive equilibrium if it were
true both that:  (1)  states adopt corporate law regimes which tend to  favor
managerial  interests  over shareholder  interests  where  there  is  substantial
divergence  of interests;  and  (2)  reincorporation  to  Delaware  often pro-
vides  some additional  value,  on the margin,  to shareholders  if Delaware
offers advantages  not reflected  in its substantive  rules. This reasoning  can
70.  See generally  Fisch, supra  note 3.
71.  See Bebchuk, supra note 2; Bebchuk & Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate  Law, supra  note
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be captured formally  in  a model  where such an  outcome is  a competitive
equilibrium.72
Even if it were empirically true (which we do not believe it is) that the
superiority  of Delaware  for many  shareholders  lies in  its having  a better
substantive  regime,  this  should  still  be the beginning,  not the  end,  of the
analysis. Where states have ended up overall could still be questioned. One
could, for example,  imagine a takeover regime,  such  as the one  embodied
in the British City Code,73  that is far more hospitable to takeovers  than that
of Delaware or any other state.  Or one might believe that it would be pref-
erable  to have  a regime  even  more  protective of target management than
that  currently  provided  by  any  state.  A  regime  in  which  dead-hand  and
slow-hand poison pills74  were permitted  and routinely  used would  be one
such example.
III
DOES STATE COMPETITION  WORK WELL IN THE AREA OF TAKEOVER
REGULATION?
Despite the substantial similarity in state corporate law regimes, there
is some significant variance  among states  in their regulation  of takeovers.
Although  most states  have adopted  some antitakeover  statutes,  important
differences remain between states'  antitakeover stances. Supporters of state
competition have sought to reconcile their position that competition  works
well  with the view, which  is supported  by the  evidence, that antitakeover
statutes often  do not serve  shareholders.  To this end, they have made  em-
pirical  claims  that  state  competition  does  not reward,  and  thus  does  not
contribute to, the adoption of antitakeover protections. As this Part shows,
however, these empirical claims are unconvincing.
A.  The View that States Restrict Takeovers Excessively
State takeover  law consists  of two basic components. First, states im-
pose rules  on bidders wishing to  acquire companies.  These rules  are usu-
ally contained in antitakeover statutes. Second, takeover  law includes rules
governing  the use  of defensive  tactics by managers  wishing to  defeat  an
unwanted  takeover bid. In Delaware,  the law  on defensive  tactics consists
almost  entirely of judge-made  law.  In  other states,  statutory  law  plays  a
72.  See  OREN  BAR-GILL  ET AL.,  supra note 7.  This model does  differ from the position  adopted
by William Cary in an important respect.  Cary believed in a "race  to the bottom"  equilibrium  in which
Delaware  was offering especially poor corporate  rules. See Cary, supra note  1. In contrast, this model
puts  forward  a  race-to-the-bottom  equilibrium  in which  Delaware  is  slightly better  than  other states
with respect to serving shareholders'  interests.
73.  See Bebchuk & Ferrell, A New Approach, supra note 3,  at 129-30 (describing the British City
Code regime).
74.  These types of poison pills are more difficult for a board of directors to rescind than standard
poison pills.
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more  important  role  in the form of poison-pill-endorsement  statutes  and
constituency  statutes.75
While case law,  such as Delaware's law on the use of defensive tac-
tics, is extremely  important, empirical studies of the effect of takeover law
on shareholder wealth has focused on antitakeover statutes, including stat-
utes addressing the use of defensive tactics. Because these statutes are pro-
posed and adopted on specific dates, they allow for empirical estimation of
their effects. The evidence  from this research  consistently shows that anti-
takeover statutes virtually never increase  firm value  and, in fact, often de-
crease it.
76
While a typical  antitakeover statute has a negative, albeit modest, ef-
fect on shareholder value, there are three states that have gained notoriety
for the extreme  nature of their antitakeover  statutes. Massachusetts,  Ohio,
and Pennsylvania have adopted antitakeover statutes77 that either impede or
substantially reduce the attractiveness of takeovers  above and beyond that
normally  associated with state antitakeover statutes. All three antitakeover
statutes  have been heavily criticized and identified in empirical  studies as
causing a substantial reduction in firm value.78
Supporters of state competition are among those who tend to believe
that states often restrict takeovers excessively.  For instance, Ralph Winter,
one of the early influential  proponents  of the pro-state  competition posi-
tion, has  expressed his belief that a legal regime that facilitates takeovers
increases  firm  value.79  Frank  Easterbrook  and  Daniel  Fischel  have
famously  argued  that  managers  should  be  "passive"  in  the  face  of  a
takeover and not engage in defensive  tactics.80  Another  leading pro-state
75.  Poison-pill-endorsement  statutes  explicitly  authorize  the  use of the "poison  pill"  defense
against hostile takeovers, a defense that is often highly effective. Constituency statutes explicitly permit
target management to take into  account the interests of nonshareholder groups,  such as  employees, to
justify fending off hostile takeovers.
76.  See,  e.g.,  Jonathan  M.  Karpoff  &  Paul  H.  Malatesta,  The  Wealth  Effects  of Second-
Generation State  Takeover Legislation, 25  J.  FIN.  ECON.  291  (1989)  (noting  that  forty  second-
generation  statutes adopted  in twenty-six  states had,  on average,  a -.294 % impact  on stock prices on
the date that the earliest known newspaper article concerning the proposed legislation  appeared).  For a
survey of the  many event studies on state antitakeover statutes,  see GRANT  GARTMAN,  supra note  12,
STATE ANTITAKEOVER LAWs (on file with authors).
77.  See supra  notes  12-14.
78.  See Jonathan  M. Karpoff & Paul H.  Malatesta, Pennsylvania  Lav: State Antitakeover Lavs
and Stock Prices, 46  FIN.  ANALYST  J.  8  (1990)  (examining Pennsylvania's  antitakeover  statute);  L.
Mick  Swartz,  The  1990  Pennsylvania Antitakeover Law:  Should Firms Opt  Out of Antitakeover
Legislation,  11  J.  AccT.,  AUDITING,  &  FIN.  223  (1996)  (examining  Pennsylvania's  antitakeover
statute);  Samuel  J. Szewcyk  &  George  P. Tsetsekos,  State Intervention in the Market  for Corporate
Control: The  Case of Pennsylvania Senate Bill  1320,  31  J.  FIN.  EON.  3  (1992)  (examining
Pennsylvania's  antitakeover  statute);  Robert  Daines,  Do  Staggered  Boards  Affect  Firm  Value?
Massachusetts  and the Market for Corporate  Control (2001)  (unpublished working  paper, on file with
authors) (examining Massachusetts's  antitakeover statute).
79.  Winter, supra note 2, at 289.
80.  See  generally  Frank H.  Easterbrook  &  Daniel  R.  Fischel,  The Proper  Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv.  L. REV.  1161 (1981).
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competition  theorist,  Roberta Romano,  has  forthrightly acknowledged  the
"dismal track records of most states in takeover regulation. 81
How  do supporters  of state competition square  this circle?  The stock
response has been to emphasize  the fact that Delaware,  the leading corpo-
rate  law jurisdiction,  has a less restrictive antitakeover statute than that of
many  other states.  They reason that if the most successful state has among
the mildest of antitakeover  statutes, then  it follows  that state competition
does  not  encourage  states  to  impose  excessive  antitakeover  protections.
Specifically,  supporters  of state competition have made the following four
claims:  (1)  Delaware  corporations  have  a higher  incidence  of bids  and a
higher  acquisition  rate,  indicating  that Delaware's  takeover  law  is  more
hospitable to takeovers;  (2)  Direct observation of the terms of states'  anti-
takeover  laws  also  reveals  that  Delaware's  takeover regime  is  relatively
moderate;  (3)  The  market  for  incorporations  has  penalized  those  states
that  have  enacted  extreme  antitakeover  statutes,  such  as  Massachusetts,
Ohio,  and Pennsylvania;  and  (4)  The  adoption  of state antitakeover  stat-
utes is  largely  outside  the normal  parameters  of state  competition for  in-
corporations.  We will examine each of these four claims in turn.
B.  Claims that  Delaware Corporations  Are Acquired More Often
Robert  Daines's  Tobin's  Q  study,  discussed  in  Part  I,  identified
Delaware's  takeover regime  as one  of the factors  accounting  for a higher
Tobin's  Q  among  Delaware  firms.82  He  found  that  Delaware  firms  are
more  likely  to receive  bids  and are  more  likely to be  acquired  than non-
Delaware  firms.83 Daimes  attributed the different bid and acquisition  rates
of Delaware firms to Delaware's provision of fewer impediments to hostile
bids. 84
This attribution of the different bid and acquisition rates of Delaware
firms to Delaware's takeover law is unwarranted  for several reasons. First,
although  cleanly  separating  friendly  and  hostile  acquisitions  is  tricky, 85
Daines  fails  to  distinguish between  friendly  and  hostile  acquisitions.  Be-
cause the majority of all acquisitions are friendly, the difference in acquisi-
tion incidence  might be due in large part to differences  in the incidence  of
friendly  acquisitions  of Delaware  and non-Delaware  firms.  Even  if one
were  to  take the view  that Delaware  is mildly more  hospitable  to hostile
81.  Roberta Romano,  Competition  for Corporate  Charters and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes,
61  FORDHAM L. REV. 843,  860 (1993).
82.  Daines, supra  note 3, at 542-49. On a related note, Peter Dodd and Richard Leftwich attribute
the  high  rate of reincorporation  to Delaware  in  the late  1960s  to  Delaware's  relatively  permissive
stance on mergers and tender offers. See Dodd & Leftwich, supra  note 37, at 268.
83.  Daines, supra note 3, at 547.
84.  Id.  at 542-49.
85.  See  G.  William  Schwert, Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder?, 55  J.  FIN.
2599 (2000).
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takeovers  than other states, it would be hard to attribute  a substantial  dif-
ference  in the incidence of friendly acquisitions  to this mild difference  in
the treatment of hostile acquisitions. 6
Rather than attributing the different acquisition (and bid) rates to dif-
ferences in the treatment of hostile bids, the more plausible explanation for
the differences  between  Delaware  and non-Delaware  firms  is  once  again
self-selection.  Firms  choosing to incorporate  in Delaware are  different  in
some  way,  and  the  differences  between  them  and  non-Delaware  firms
could be responsible for the different bid and acquisition rates. This theory
is more plausible  because the differences  between Delaware takeover law
and that of most other states are relatively minor, as we will explain in the
next Section, and are therefore unlikely to account for the observed varia-
tion  in the overall incidence of friendly and hostile acquisitions.  Interest-
ingly,  a  recent  empirical  study  found  that  whether  a  target  firm  is  a
Delaware  firm or not has no  effect on the outcome  of a hostile bid. 7  In
sum, Daines's  findings  do  not provide  a  firm  basis  for  concluding  that
Delaware is more hospitable to takeovers than other states.
C.  Claims that  Delaware's  Takeover Law Is Relatively Moderate
It is far from clear that Delaware offers  less  antitakeover protection
than most other states. While it is true that some states have more antitake-
over statutes or antitakeover statutes of a more extreme nature, others, such
as California, have no such statutes.
More importantly,  an assessment of Delaware's relative position can-
not be based merely on a comparison of antitakeover statutes because case
law plays a central role in Delaware's takeover regulation. Delaware has a
well developed  body of case law, which makes the absence  of some types
of  antitakeover  statutes  practically  irrelevant.  Delaware's  judges  have
played  an active role in developing  legal doctrines  that permit the use of
defensive  tactics  in general  and the potent poison pill defense  in particu-
lar.88 Because of the large body of Delaware judge-made law upholding the
indefinite use of poison pills,89 there is no need for an antitakeover statute
explicitly  authorizing  the use  of poison  pills  (a  poison-pill-endorsement
statute)  or for an  antitakeover constituency  statute that provides managers
with discretion to defend against bids.
86.  Guhan  Subramanian  found  no  differences  between  Delaware  and  non-Delaware  firms  in
terms  of the incidence of hostile  bids. Subramanian, supra  note  15.  Thus, according to this evidence,
the difference in acquisition rates is largely due to the incidence of friendly acquisitions.
87.  See Lucian  A.  Bebchuk  et al.,  The Powerful Antitakeover of Staggered Boards: Theory,
Evidence, andPolicy,  54 STAN.  L. REv. 887 (2002).
88.  See Bebchuk & Ferrell, A New Approach, supra  note 3, at 117-28.
89.  Id.
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Furthermore, Delaware's  case  law  on the use of poison pills has ren-
dered the absence of a control-share-acquisition  antitakeover statute 9' and a
fair-price  antitakeover  statute9'  practically  irrelevant;  as  long  as a poison
pill is in place, any additional antitakeover defense is superfluous since the
pill completely  blocks  a bidder from  proceeding.  Were  a bidder to  over-
come the poison  pill defense  by taking control  of the target  corporation's
board  in  a  proxy  contest  (and  having  the poison  pill  redeemed  by  the
board),  a control-share-acquisition  antitakeover statute and a fair-price an-
titakeover statute, which are usually only applicable  to bids that the board
does not approve, would still be irrelevant.
In contrast, the  adoption  of additional  antitakeover statutes  might be
more significant events for states with less developed case law. Poison-pill-
endorsement statutes and constituency  statutes in such states might provide
managers  with the confidence,  notwithstanding the limited case law  in the
state, that indefinite use of a poison pill defense will be tolerated.  Further-
more, the adoption of additional  antitakeover statutes may also convey the
message  that the  state is committed  to  providing substantial  protection to
managers  who  are facing  unwanted  takeovers.  Delaware  has  already sent
this  message loud  and clear through its case  law. Thus,  it is far from evi-
dent that Delaware's  antitakeover  law is more  moderate;  any  comparison
between  Delaware's  takeover regime  and those  of other states  must take
into account  the central  role in takeover regulation  played by  Delaware's
extensive case law.
Although  it  is  difficult  to  compare  Delaware's  takeover  regime  di-
rectly to that of other states, much can be learned about the merits of state
competition  from a more  systematic comparison  of how states other  than
Delaware  fare in the incorporation  market  when  they adopt  various  anti-
takeover  statutes. Given that these states vary  widely in their antitakeover
statutes  and how they fare in the incorporation market, a cross-comparison
within the group of non-Delaware companies would be helpful in obtaining
a better understanding  on how the incorporation  market reacts to  different
levels of antitakeover protection. Part IV discusses this approach.
D.  Claims that Outlier  States Have Been Penalized
Supporters  of state  competition  often  point to  the  extreme  antitake-
over  statutes  of Massachusetts,  Ohio  and  Pennsylvania  as  examples  of
Delaware's  virtue. Consistent with this view, pro-state  competition  schol-
ars92 have suggested that these three states have been penalized rather than
90.  Control-share-acquisition  statutes  typically  require  an  acquirer  to  obtain  approval  of  the
shareholders before it can exercise the voting rights of the control share.
91.  Fair-price statutes regulate the price at which acquirers can purchase outstanding shares.
92.  See EASTERBROOK  & FISCHEL, supra 2; ROMANO,  GENIUS,  supra note 2; Romano, Lmv  as a
Product,  supra note 2.
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rewarded  by the incorporation  market as  a result of their  actions.  More-
over,  these  scholars  have directed  some  of their  empirical  work towards
documenting  the adverse  effects  that  these  extreme  antitakeover  statutes
have had on shareholders.
For example, Robert Daines has found that Massachusetts companies
have lower Tobin's  Qs than those  of Delaware firms. 3  In  another  study,
Daines found that the adoption of Massachusetts's  antitakeover statute was
accompanied by a significant reduction in the share value of Massachusetts
companies.94 This second study is consistent with earlier studies that found
strong negative stock reactions  to the adoption of the antitakeover  statutes
of all three states. However, this work simply shows that the antitakeover
statutes  of these  states harm shareholders,  a point with which we readily
agree.  This harm to shareholders  in no way establishes  that these  states
have, in fact, been penalized by the incorporation market as a result of their
bad behavior.
Roberta Romano has pointed out that many Pennsylvania  companies
have opted out of Pennsylvania's extreme antitakeover statute.9 5 She argues
that this indicates  that state  competition  has worked well. However, such
an inference should not be drawn. Because the opt-out procedure under the
Pennsylvania  antitakeover  statute  was  simple,  the  managers  of
Pennsylvania companies that chose to opt out were not harmed by the pas-
sage of the statute. In contrast, those managers  of companies  that did not
opt out  obtained  substantial  antitakeover  protections  that they  would not
have enjoyed  otherwise. The substantial  incidence of opting out thus  does
not imply that the passage of the Pennsylvania antitakeover statute did not
serve managerial interests at a substantial fraction of Pennsylvania  compa-
nies at shareholders'  expense. More to the point, it does not imply that pas-
sage  of the  statute  harmed  Pennsylvania  in  the  market  for  corporate
charters.
The evidence  provided by the supporters  of state competition  there-
fore fails to demonstrate that the outlier states have actually been disadvan-
taged  in  the  incorporation  market,  as  they  should  have  been  if state
competition  does,  as its  supporters  assert, penalize  the adoption  of share-
holder-welfare-reducing  corporate  rules.  Surprisingly,  supporters  of state
competition  have made  no  effort to  directly test their prediction that the
actions  of the  outlier states would actually hurt them in the  incorporation
market. As we shall discuss in Part IV, this predicted effect does not in fact
exist.
93.  Daines, supra  note 3, at 546.
94.  See Daines, supra  note 78 (examining Massachusetts'  antitakeover statute).
95.  See ROMANO,  GENIUS, supra note 2, at 68-70.
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E.  Claims that  Antitakeover Statutes Are Outside the Parameters  of  State
Competition
In an effort to reconcile their views on state competition with the evi-
dence on antitakeover statutes,  state competition proponents  have  also ar-
gued  that  many  antitakeover  statutes  were  passed  to  prevent  particular,
politically influential local companies from being acquired. Therefore, pro-
ponents  argue, these statutes represent an aberration outside  of the normal
parameters  of state competition."  On this view, even though the adoption
of such statutes  does not serve  and indeed hurts the  goal of attracting in-
corporations,  states  have adopted  them because  of the political  power  of
some in-state corporate targets.97
As Ralph Winter puts it:  "The problem is not that states compete  for
charters but that too often they do not."98 The desire to increase the number
of incorporations  does not encourage  states to adopt antitakeover statutes;
to the contrary, it moderates their tendency, due to lobbying by firms, to do
so.  This  argument  predicts  that  states that  adopt  antitakeover  statutes  to
protect  particular  companies,  disregarding  the  incorporation  market,  will
attract fewer incorporations as a result.
Supporters  of state  competition  have made  no  attempt, however,  to
test this prediction by examining how the adoption of antitakeover statutes
has  actually  affected  states'  success  in the incorporation  market.  As  we
shall discuss  in Part IV, the evidence does not confirm this prediction but
rather indicates  that adopting antitakeover statutes  makes  states more, not
less, successful in the incorporation market.
IV
RECENT EVIDENCE ON  THE DETERMINANTS  OF INCORPORATION  DECISIONS
A.  A New Approach
A natural way to determine how state competition actually works, and
whether  or  not it benefits  shareholders'  interests,  is  to  focus  directly  on
how the  choices states  make with regard to corporate legal regimes  affect
their competitive  position in the market  for corporate  charters. According
to the race-to-the-top position, states that adopt legal regimes that diminish
shareholder wealth  should suffer by attracting  fewer incorporations.  Con-
versely,  states  that  adopt  legal  regimes  that enhance  shareholder  wealth
should be  rewarded with  increased  numbers  of incorporations.  These are
testable propositions.
96.  See, e.g.,  Winter, supra  note 2, at 270.
97.  See  Roberta  Romano,  The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73  VA.  L.  REV.  111
(1987).
98.  Ralph K. Winter, Foreword,  in ROMANO,  GENIUS, supra note 2, at xi.
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Unfortunately,  prior  empirical  work has  not pursued  this  approach.
Rather, the question it has  asked is:  Given  incorporation decisions,  does
Delaware  incorporation  increase  firm value? 99  As  Part I has  emphasized,
this analysis  is  often equivalent  to assuming  that incorporation  decisions
are random events, allowing researchers  to treat an incorporation  decision
as a given. But the fundamental  premise of the state competition  debate,
whichever  side one  takes,  is that incorporation  decisions  are not random
but deliberate.
Another shortcoming  of most existing  empirical  work is that it typi-
cally  begins  its  analysis  by  dividing  the  incorporation  market  between
Delaware and non-Delaware firms. It then investigates whether incorporat-
ing in (or reincorporating  to) Delaware  benefits  investors.  This approach
effectively lumps together all the non-Delaware  states into one undifferen-
tiated mass  and thus  overlooks  important variations  that exist among  the
non-Delaware states.
The variations  among the non-Delaware  states are  significant in cer-
tain respects. In particular, states vary widely in how successful they are in
retaining companies  already headquartered  in them ("in-state companies")
and  in  attracting  corporations  headquartered  elsewhere  ("out-of-state
companies"). Furthermore, although states are overall rather similar in their
corporate laws, there is still significant variance among states in some areas
of corporate  law,  such as takeover law.  Thus,  the variation  among  states
both in terms of their laws and in terms of their success in the incorpora-
tion market provides  a natural  laboratory  for examining which  corporate
rules make states more or less attractive.
There  is yet  another advantage  of our approach  that is  worth high-
lighting. Delaware  is a special case because  of the important  institutional
advantages  it offers shareholders. Thus, in comparisons between Delaware
and non-Delaware  corporations,  it is  difficult to disentangle  the effects  of
these  institutional advantages  from the effects  of different substantive  cor-
porate rules. By focusing on the large set of non-Delaware  states, it is pos-
sible  to  make  comparisons  among  states,  none  of which has the  special
"Delaware advantages."  Removing this variable makes it easier to identify
the  effects  that  variations  in  legal  rules  have  on  the  distribution  of
incorporations.
Below  we  illustrate  the  value  of this  approach by presenting  some
summary statistics and simple cross-state comparisons. A separate study by
two of us (the Incorporation Study) has carried out a full empirical analysis
of the  determinants  of domicile  decisions."0  We  will  focus  here  on  the
findings of this study concerning how takeover rules affect states'  ability to
99.  See, e.g., Hyman, supra  note 37.
100.  See Bebchuck & Cohen, supra  note  15.
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retain in-state companies as well as their ability to attract out-of-state com-
panies.'
The approach that we propose  can also be applied to identify how as-
pects  of state  corporate  law, other  than state takeover  law,  affect compa-
nies'  domicile  decisions.  For  example,  the Incorporation  Study  analyzes
how  a  state's  adoption  of the  Revised  Model  Business  Corporation  Act
("RMBCA") affects  its  success. 2  We focus here on takeover rules, how-
ever, because of the importance of these rules in the debate over the merits
of state competition. We start by describing how incorporations  are distrib-
uted among the states. We then examine the distribution of various types of
antitakeover  statutes.  Finally,  we  analyze  these  patterns  to  determine
whether  or  not  antitakeover  statutes  actually  help  states  retain  in-state
companies and attract out-of-state companies.
B.  The Pattern  of  Incorporations
How does  each  state  fare in terms of retaining its in-state companies
and attracting  out-of-state companies?  Surprisingly,  most of the  empirical
work on state competition  has  not documented  these basic  patterns  of in-
corporation.  Indeed, it has not even documented how the 50%  of total in-
corporations  not  captured  by  Delaware  are  currently  distributed  among
different states.
The patterns we describe  account for all the  incorporations  of nonfi-
nancial  publicly  traded  companies  for  which  there  was  data  in  the
Compustat  database  at the  end of 1999  and  which have both  their head-
quarters  and their incorporations  in the United States." 3  There  were 6530
such companies. Table 1 displays how the headquarters  of these companies
are distributed among states. By "states"  we mean throughout the fifty-one
jurisdictions consisting of the fifty states and the District of Columbia.
101.  Guhan  Subramanian also studies  empirically the effects  of antitakeover statutes on the ability
of states  to  retain  their  in-state  companies.  See  Subramanian,  supra note  15.  As  will  be  discussed
below, his  conclusions are  consistent with those of Bebchuk  and Cohen's  Incorporation  Study, supra
note  15, with respect to standard  antitakeover statutes but not with respect to extreme statutes. He does
not study the effect of states' antitakeover statutes on their success in attracting  out-of-state companies.
102.  It was found that adopting the RMBCA did not help states retain their in-state companies and
it made states less attractive to out-of-state companies. See Bebchuck & Cohen, supra  note  15, at  13.
103.  In  focusing  on nonfinancial  firms we  follow  the approach  of Robert  Daimes's  study, supra
note 3. When financial companies are included,  the results are qualitatively the same.
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TABLE  1
THE DISTRIBUTION OF FIRm LOCATIONS AMONG  STATES
Number of  firms
State  located in state  Percentage
CA  1,254  19.20%
TX  586  8.97%
NY  576  8.82%
MA  360  5.51%
FL  328  5.02%
NJ  311  4.76%
PA  248  3.80%
IL  241  3.69%
MN  212  3.25%
CO  201  3.08%
OH  192  2.94%
GA  178  2.73%
VA  154  2.36%
CT  147  2.25%
WA  131  2.01%
Ml  104  1.59%
MiD  101  1.55%
MO  101  1.55%
NC  98  1.50%
AZ  91  1.39%
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Table  2  displays  the  distribution  of incorporations  among  states.  A  com-
parison of Tables 1 and 2 reveals the considerable  differences  between the
distributions of headquarters and incorporations.
TABLE 2
THE DISTRIBUTION  OF INCORPORATIONS  AMONG  STATES
Number of firms
State  incorporated in state  Percentage
DE  3,771  57.75%
CA  283  4.33%
NY  226  3.46%
NV  217  3.32%
MN  178  2.73%
FL  165  2.53%
TX  147  2.25%
CO  132  2.02%
PA  124  1.90%
MA  118  1.81%
OH  112  1.72%
NJ  111  1.70%
GA  83  1.27%
WA  79  1.21%
VA  74  1.13%
MI  60  0.92%
WI  57  0.87%
MD  54  0.83%
OR  54  0.83%
UT  52  0.80%
IN  50  0.77%
NC  46  0.70%
TN  39  0.60%
MO  36  0.55%
IL  32  0.49%
Other  230  3.52%
Total  6,530  100%
Table 3 displays  how each state fares in the market for incorporations. The
Table  displays  the  following  for each  state:  (1)  how  many of its in-state
companies  it retains, both in absolute  numbers  and as  a percentage  of all
in-state  companies;  and  (2)  how many  out-of-state  companies  it attracts,
again in absolute numbers and as a percentage of all out-of-state incorpora-
tions.
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TABLE 3
MIGRATION  AND  EMIGRATION  IN THE "MARKET  FOR CORPORATE  LAW"
Number  Number of fums  Number of fi-ms
of firms  located and  As percentage of  located elsewhere  As percentage  of
located  incorporated  all firms located  but incorporated  all out-of state
State  in state  in state  in this state  in state  incorporations
AK  2  1  50.00%  2  0.03%
AL  29  3  10.34%  2  0.03%
AR  20  3  15.00%  0  0.00%
AZ  91  21  23.08%  0  0.00%
CA  1,254  273  21.77%  10  0.19%
CO  201  74  36.82%  58  0.92%
CT  147  17  11.56%  3  0.05%
DC  25  2  8.00%  0  0.00%
DE  27  27  100.00%  3,744  57.57%
FL  328  137  41.77%  28  0.45%
GA  178  71  39.89%  12  0.19%
HI  13  6  46.15%  2  0.03%
IA  25  10  40.00%  4  0.06%
ID  15  2  13.33%  1  0.02%
IL  241  27  11.20%  5  0.08%
IN  56  39  69.64%  11  0.17%
KS  35  11  31.43%  8  0.12%
KY  29  7  24.14%  2  0.03%
LA  45  18  40.00%  4  0.06%
MA  360  108  30.00%  10  0.16%
MD  101  25  24.75%  29  0.45%
ME  10  4  40.00%  0  0.00%
MI  104  58  55.77%  2  0.03%
MN  212  158  74.53%  20  0.32%
MO  101  26  25.74%  10  0.16%
MS  14  4  28.57%  8  0.12%
MT  6  6  100.00%  0  0.00%
NC  98  38  38.78%  0  0.00%
ND  4  0  0.00%  0  0.00%
NE  18  4  22.22%  3  0.05%
NH  28  3  10.71%  0  0.00%
NJ  311  80  25.72%  31  0.50%
NM  9  4  44.44%  3  0.05%
NV  63  45  71.43%  172  2.66%
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TABLE  3 (cont.)
Number  Number of firms  Number of firms
of firms  located and  As percentage of  located elsewhere  As percentage of
located  incorporated  all firms located  but incorporated  all out-of state
State  in state  in state  in this state  in state  incorporations
NY  576  141  24.48%  85  1.43%
OH  192  105  54.69%  7  0.11%
OK  61  22  36.07%  5  0.08%
OR  70  50  71.43%  4  0.06%
PA  248  98  39.52%  26  0.41%
RI  24  6  25.00%  1  0.02%
SC  30  9  30.00%  1  0.02%
SD  7  4  57.14%  0  0.00%
TN  81  33  40.74%  6  0.09%
TX  586  139  23.72%  8  0.13%
UT  70  32  45.71%  20  0.31%
VA  154  56  36.36%  18  0.28%
VT  11  4  36.36%  0  0.00%
WA  131  68  51.91%  11  0.17%
WI  72  52  72.22%  5  0.08%
WV  8  3  37.50%  0  0.00%
WY  9  3  33.33%  12  0.18%
Total  6530  2137  4393
Average  38.10%  1.33%
Table  3 indicates  that the  large majority of states  are net "exporters"
of companies. The Tables also indicate that there is a great deal of variance
among non-Delaware  states in terms of how they fare, both in retaining in-
state  companies  and  in  attracting  out-of-state  companies.  For  example,
whereas California retains only 21.77% of its in-state  companies,  Ohio and
Washington retain more  than 50%,  and Minnesota and  Indiana retain  ap-
proximately  70%.  As  for  out-of-state  incorporations,  while  thirty-three
states attract  less  than ten  out-of-state  incorporations  each,  there are  four
states with more than fifty each. The question on which we shall focus next
is the extent to which this relative performance  depends on the antitakeover
statutes adopted by the various states.
C.  The Landscape of  State Antitakeover Statutes
Table  4, which is taken from Grant Gartman's comprehensive  survey
of state antitakeover  statutes, °4 indicates  which antitakeover statutes  each
104.  See GARTMAN, supra  note 12.
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state  has. Most states have at least one  antitakeover  statute. Pennsylvania,
Ohio and Massachusetts  also have unique antitakeover statutes that will be
discussed separately. The vast majority of these statutes were adopted dur-
ing the period from 1985 to 1991.
TABLE 4
STANDARD ANTITAKEOVER  STATUTES
No
Freezeouts
Number of  Control  (years  Poison Pill
State  Statutes  Share  Fair Price  prohibited)  Endorsement  Constituencies
Alaska  0  0  0  0  0  0
Alabama  0  0  0  0  0  0
Arkansas  0  0  0  0  0  0
Arizona  4  1  1  3  0  1
California  0  0  0  0  0  0
Colorado  1  0  0  0  1  0
Connecticut  3  0  1  5  0  1
DC  0  0  0  0  0  0
Delaware  1  0  0  3  0  0
Florida  4  1  1  0  1  1
Georgia  4  0  1  5  1  1
Hawaii  3  1  0  0  1  1
Iowa  3  0  0  3  1  1
Idaho  5  1  1  3  1  1
Illinois  4  0  1  3  1  1
Indiana  5  1  1  5  1  1
Kansas  2  1  0  3  0  0
Kentucky  4  0  1  5  1  1
Louisiana  3  1  1  0  0  1
Massachusetts  4  1  0  5  1  1
Maryland  5  1  1  5  1  1
Maine  1  0  0  0  0  1
Michigan  3  1  1  5  0  0
Minnesota  4  1  1  4  0  1
Missouri  4  1  1  5  0  1
Mississippi  3  1  1  0  0  1
Montana  0  0  0  0  0  0
North Carolina  3  1  1  0  1  0
North Dakota  1  0  0  0  0  1
Nebraska  2  1  0  5  0  0
New Hampshire  0  0  0  0  0  0
New Jersey  4  0  1  5  1  1
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TABLE 4  (cont.)
No
Freezeouts
Number of  Control  (years  Poison Pill
State  Statutes  Share  Fair Price  prohibited)  Endorsement  Constituencies
New Mexico  1  0  0  0  0  1
Nevada  5  1  1  3  1  1
New York  4  0  1  5  1  1
Ohio  5  1  1  3  1  1
Oklahoma  2  1  0  3  0  0
Oregon  4  1  0  3  1  1
Pennsylvania  5  1  1  5  1  1
Rhode Island  4  0  1  5  1  1
South Carolina  3  1  1  2  0  0
South Dakota  5  1  1  4  1  1
Tennessee  5  1  1  5  1  1
Texas  1  0  0  3  0  0
Utah  2  1  0  0  1  0
Virginia  4  1  1  3  1  0
Vermont  1  0  0  0  0  1
Washington  3  0  1  5  1  0
Wisconsin  5  1  1  3  1  1
West Virginia  0  0  0  0  0  0
Wyoming  3  1  0  3  0  1
Average/total  2.7  27  27  32  25  31
The  standard  antitakeover  statutes  are  control-share-acquisition  stat-
utes, fair-price  statutes, three-year no-freezeout business combination  stat-
utes,  five-year  no-freezeout  business  combination  statutes,  poison-pill-
endorsement  statutes,  and  constituency  statutes.  Control-share-acquisition
statutes  typically require  a would-be  acquirer to win approval  from a ma-
jority of outstanding disinterested shares before it can acquire control. Fair-
price statutes attempt to ensure that an acquirer does not pay a premium for
control and then buy the remaining  shares  at a lower price. No-freezeout
business combination  statutes  prohibit acquirers,  under certain  conditions,
from  merging  with  the  acquired  company  for a certain  number of years,
typically either three or five years. Poison-pill-endorsement statutes explic-
itly authorize the use of the poison pill defense by target management. Fi-
nally, constituency  statutes  authorize  the  use of defensive  tactics,  such  as
the  poison pill  defense, by  target  management  in the name  of nonshare-
holder constituencies, such as employees.
The antitakeover statutes adopted by states might have been important
not only in what they actually  did,  but also  arguably in  the  antitakeover
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message they sent. For instance, adopting the full arsenal of standard anti-
takeover  statutes  sends a clear antitakeover message  to state  courts and to
potential  and  existing  incorporators.  Therefore,  in  assessing  the  overall
level of protection against takeovers it is of interest to look at a state's total
number of standard antitakeover  statutes. To study cross-state  differences
in shareholder protection, the Incorporation  Study uses an antitakeover in-
dex that attaches to each state a score from zero to five, which corresponds
to the number of antitakeover statutes it has among the five standard types.
In  addition  to the  standard  antitakeover  statutes,  unusual  and more
restrictive  statutes  were  adopted  by three  states.  Pennsylvania  and  Ohio
adopted  statutes  that enable the  "disgorgement"  or "recapture"  of all the
short-term  profits  made  by  a hostile  bidder."°  Massachusetts  adopted  a
statute that mandates  a classified board structure even for companies that
did not elect to have a classified board in their charter," 0 6  a requirement that
has a powerful antitakeover effect.  107
D.  Do Antitakeover Statutes Help States Retain In-State Companies?
One fact that is immediately apparent from looking at the distribution
of incorporations  from Table 3  is the presence of "home preference."  States
generally  are  better  able  to attract  incorporations  from  companies  head-
quartered  in  them  than  from  companies  headquartered  elsewhere.  Even
states that hardly attract any out-of-state incorporations are commonly able
to retain a significant fraction of their in-state companies. However, states
do vary greatly in the fraction of in-state companies that they retain.
Table  3 indicates  that states  without  antitakeover  statutes  do rather
poorly in terms of retaining their companies. Whereas the average  fraction
of in-state  companies  retained  is  38%,  most  states with  no  antitakeover
statutes retain a much  lower fraction. For example,  California retains only
21.77%  of its  in-state companies.  Conversely,  Table 3 also indicates  that
states with  all the  standard antitakeover  statutes  generally retain a larger-
than-average fraction of their in-state companies. For example, Indiana and
Wisconsin, each of which offers  a "royal  flush"  set of five standard anti-
takeover statutes, retain 69.64% and 72.22%, respectively,  of their in-state
companies.  Finally,  observe  that  Pennsylvania  and  Ohio,  both  of which
have the notorious recapture statute, retain a larger-than-average  fraction of
their  in-state  companies.  Pennsylvania  retains  39.52%  of all  its  in-state
companies, and Ohio retains 54.69% of all its in-state companies. The third
"misbehaving"  state, Massachusetts,  retains 30.00%  of its in-state compa-
nies, a figure a bit below the average.
105.  See supra notes  13-14.
106.  See supra note 12.
107.  See Bebehuk et al., supra note 87.
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Of course, these initial observations are merely suggestive, and a more
systematic testing is necessary  before definite conclusions can be reached.
One needs  to control  for factors  other than state antitakeover statutes  that
might  be  influencing  the  incorporation  decisions  of in-state  companies.
The Incorporation Study accomplished this by controlling  for a number  of
factors that could conceivably be important, including characteristics of the
incorporating  company  as well  as  characteristics  of the state  in which the
company  is headquartered.'0
This testing indicates that having a larger antitakeover index-that  is,
a larger  number of antitakeover  statutes-makes  a  state  more  likely (at  a
99%  confidence  level,  the  highest  degree  of  confidence  conventionally
used in such testing) to retain its in-state companies. Of the different  anti-
takeover  statutes, the  ones most useful in retaining in-state  companies are
control-share-acquisition  statutes, no-freezeout  statutes  with a moratorium
period of more than three years, and poison-pill-endorsement  statutes.' 0 9
This testing  indicates that the effect of adopting  antitakeover  statutes
is not only statistically significant but also large in magnitude.  Controlling
for other  firm and state characteristics,  the Incorporation  Study  estimates
that, had states that currently have  all the standard antitakeover  statutes not
adopted them,  the fraction of local firms that they retain would have been
reduced  from the  current  49% of such  firms  to  23%.'  Conversely,  it  is
estimated  that adopting all the  standard antitakeover statutes by states that
currently have no  such statutes would  have raised the percentage  of local
firms that they retain from 23%  to 50%."'
Finally, consistent with the observations  made above, the testing indi-
cates  that providing a recapture antitakeover statute,  as  do Pennsylvania"
2
and Ohio,"'  does  not adversely  affect a state's  ability to  retain its in-state
companies. With respect to the classified board statute of Massachusetts,  14
the results are mixed, depending on the type of testing done, but overall do
not support the prediction that enacting such a statute would hurt an adopt-
ing state in the incorporation market."5
108.  Controlled-for  characteristics  of  the  company  included  the  company's  sales,  Tobin's  Q,
return  on  assets,  number  of employees,  and  age  (when  the  company  went  public).  Controlled-for
characteristics  of the  state  in  which  the  company  is  headquartered  included  the  state's  population,
number of located companies,  per capita  income, ideological  leaning, geographic  region, and whether
the state had adopted the RMBCA (or its predecessor, the Model Business Corporation Act).
109.  Guhan  Subramanian  also  tests  how the  presence of standard  antitakeover  statutes  affects
states'  ability to retain their headquartered companies, and his results are consistent with those obtained
by the Incorporation  Study. See Subramanian, supra  note  15, at 1839-41.
110.  Bebchuk & Cohen, supra  note  15.
111.  Id.
112.  See supra note 14.
113.  See supra note  13.
114.  See supra note  12.
115.  In  contrast  to  the  results  of  the  Incorporation  Study,  Subramanian  concludes  that  the
recapture  and  classified  boards  statutes  have  hurt  the  ability  of the  states  adopting  them  to  retain
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E.  Do Antitakeover Statutes Help States Attract Out-of-State
Companies?
Even if antitakeover statutes help states retain in-state companies, how
do these statutes affect their competitive position in attracting corporations
with their headquarters  in another  state?  We will now turn to this second
dimension of how states fare in the competition over incorporations.
Table  5  displays  the  distribution  of  out-of-state  incorporations  in
states other than Delaware,  and it lists all the states attracting more than six
out-of-state  incorporations.  Of the ten  (excluding  Delaware)  that  are the
most successful  in attracting  out-of-state incorporations,  eight have either
four or five antitakeover statutes.
TABLE 5
THE DIVISION  OF THE MARKET  FOR OUT-OF-STATE  INCORPORATIONS
Number of firms
State  incorporated in state  Percentage
DE  3,744  85.23%
NV  172  3.92%
NY  85  1.93%
CO  58  1.32%
NJ  31  0.71%
MD  29  0.66%
FL  28  0.64%
PA  26  0.59%
MN  20  0.46%
UT  20  0.46%
VA  18  0.41%
GA  12  0.27%
WY  12  0.27%
IN  11  0.25%
WA  11  0.25%
CA  10  0.23%
MA  10  0.23%
MO  10  0.23%
companies. See Subramanian, supra  note  15, at 1843-44. He uses one dummy variable to stand for the
presence  of either  a  recapture  or  a  classified  board  statute  and  he  controls  only  for  company
characteristics  but not  for state  characteristics  other than their antitakeover  statutes. Id. Running the
same regressions  as  Subramanian  did,  the  Incorporation  Study  obtained  similar results  to  his.  See
Bebchuck  &  Cohen,  supra note  15.  However,  in  order  to  allow  for  the  possibility  that  the
incorporations  market  did  not  treat  recapture  and  classified  boards  statutes  in  the  same  way,  the
Incorporation  Study used a separate dummy variable  for each of these statutes. With this specification,
the recapture  statute was  no  longer found to hurt the states adopting it even without introducing  state
characteristics.  Once  state characteristics were  controlled for, the results no longer indicate a negative
effect due to the classified board statute.
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TABLE  5 (cont.)
Number of firms
State  incorporated in state  Percentage
KS  8  0.18%
NC  8  0.18%
TX  8  0.18%
OH  7  0.16%
TN  6  0.14%
Other  49  1.12%
Total  4,393  100%
The figures in Table 5 provide  no basis for concluding that the three
"outlier"  states, which have been blacklisted as extreme,  have been hurt in
the market for out-of-state incorporations. Pennsylvania holds a respectable
seventh place (excluding Delaware)  in terms of the number of out-of-state
companies  it attracts. Massachusetts  and Ohio  are both comfortably in the
top half of the states in their ability to attract out-of-state companies.
Again,  definite  conclusions  cannot be  drawn without controlling  for
characteristics of states and firms. The Incorporation Study conducted  such
testing, and its conclusions confirm what is suggested by the  above obser-
vations.  The  findings  indicate  that  having  a  higher  antitakeover  index
makes a state more attractive-again, at a high 99%  confidence  level-for
out-of-state  incorporations.  Of the different types  of standard antitakeover
statutes, the ones most helpful for attracting out-of-state incorporations  are
control-share-acquisition  statutes and poison-pill-endorsement  statutes.
The testing also provides clear results with respect to the two types  of
extreme  antitakeover  statutes. Neither  a classified  board  statute nor a re-
capture  statute  has a statistically significant  effect on the ability of a state
to attract out-of-state incorporations.  Thus, again, there is no empirical  ba-
sis for concluding that the incorporations  market penalizes states adopting
extreme  antitakeover statutes.
F.  Reconsidering  Established  Positions
States have been busy  over the  last three decades  adopting  antitake-
over statutes.  They have often  gone back to the drawing board more  than
once,  either because earlier statutes  were held unconstitutional  or because
they wanted to take advantage  of newly hatched types of antitakeover stat-
utes. Many  states have ended up with most or all of the standard antitake-
over  statutes.  However, the enthusiasm  of state  officials  for such statutes
has not been matched by shareholders. The passage of antitakeover statutes
has generally been accompanied by a negative reaction or, at best, no reac-
tion in the stock price of the companies governed by them.
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As  the  pro-state  competition  position  has  long  been  the  dominant
view in corporate  law scholarship,  most students  of corporate law would
agree with the following two propositions:
(1)  Amassing  state  antitakeover  statutes  does  not  serve
shareholders;  and
(2)  State competition rewards, and thereby induces, adopting rules
that serve shareholders.
Facing  a possible  tension between  these  two  propositions,  supporters  of
state competition have sought to reconcile them by advancing an additional
proposition:
(3)  State  competition  does  not  reward,  and  indeed  might
discourage, the amassing of antitakeover statutes.
However, as  suggested by the observations  made  above,  and by the
reported results of the Incorporation Study, proposition  (3)  is inconsistent
with the evidence. This implies that the commonly held view, which con-
sists of propositions  (1)  and (2),  can no longer be maintained. Those who
have held this view should revise their position on at least one of these two
propositions. Although the evidence discussed in this Part enables rejecting
(3), it does not speak directly to which revisions  should be made.  What is
certain, however, is that the conventional picture of state competition needs
to be revised.
Our own view is that, although  some antitakeover statutes  might not
be harmful and at times arguably beneficial, "6 not all are;"7 and state com-
petition thus provides excessive incentives to restrict takeovers. If the "race
to the top" story were true, it would be particularly puzzling that competi-
tion has failed to discipline the states adopting the most extreme  antitake-
over  statutes.  Although  they  have  been  the subject  of strongly  negative
market  reaction  and widespread  criticism  by  scholars  of corporate  law,
these statutes have been on the books for a long time now. Still, the states
having these statutes continue to fare respectably in the incorporation mar-
ket-both in terms  of retaining in-state companies  and in terms of attract-
ing out-of-state companies.
Although  puzzling  for  the  conventional  race-to-the-top  view,  the
adoption  of antitakeover  statutes  and the evidence  presented  in this Part
are  not puzzling  at  all  to  those  who  hold  a  skeptical  account  of  state
116.  Control-share-acquisitions  statutes,  for example,  might  be helpful  in  the absence  of other
arrangements  in addressing pressure to tender problems. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted
Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate  Takeovers,  95  HARV.  L. REv.  1695  (1985);  LUCIAN  A.
BEBCHUK  &  OLIVER  HART,  TAKEOVER  BIDS  VS.  PROXY  FIGHTS  IN  CONTESTS  FOR  CORPORATE
CONTROL (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 8633,  2001).
117.  Poison-pill-endorsement  statutes,  for  example,  can  produce  excessive  protection  from
takeovers for the large fraction of companies that have classified boards. See Bebchuk et al., supra note
37.
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competition.  On this account, state competition can be expected to produce
excessive  protections  from  takeovers.  It is  a  natural  consequence  of the
competitive  process  itself  as  currently  structured.  This  process  provides
states  with  incentives  to  place  weight on managers'  interests,  rather than
solely  on  shareholders'  interests,  when  selecting  rules  that have  a major
effect on managers.
CONCLUSION
A recurring claim in the literature on state competition  over corporate
charters is that the existing empirical evidence decisively supports the view
that state competition benefits  shareholders.  Those who are more skeptical
of state competition  (as currently  structured) and the regulatory choices  it
has  produced,  have  often  been portrayed  as  fighting  against  established
empirical facts. This Article has shown that the body of empirical  evidence
on which supporters of state competition rely does not warrant their claims
of empirical  support.
First, the evidence does not establish that Delaware  incorporation pro-
duces  an increase  in share value.  Although studies have found  an associa-
tion between  Delaware  incorporation  and  higher shareholder  value,  there
are  significant  questions  with  respect  to  the  generality,  robustness,  and
magnitude of this correlation. More importantly, correlation does not imply
causation;  any  correlation  of the sort alleged could reflect  the underlying
differences  between  firms  that elect to incorporate  in Delaware  and those
that do not.
Second,  even  if it were  established  that Delaware  incorporation  is
marginally beneficial  to investors in the existing state-competition  equilib-
rium,  this marginal benefit does  not imply  that state competition  benefits
investors  overall.  In  a  race-toward-the-bottom  equilibrium  in  which  all
states are  induced  by competition to choose  suboptimal rules  (on  certain
issues),  incorporation  in the dominant  state might still  be beneficial  as  a
result of network  effects  and  the  dominant  state's institutional  infrastruc-
ture.
Third, we have  shown that, contrary to claims  made by supporters  of
state competition, the empirical  evidence does not establish that state com-
petition  rewards  moderate  takeover  regimes  rather than  the  amassing  of
antitakeover statutes. In particular, the claims that Delaware  is more hospi-
table to takeovers  than average,  and that states hostile to takeovers are pe-
nalized in the incorporation market, do not have a solid empirical basis.
Finally, we have discussed a new approach  to  the empirical  study  of
state competition  based on analyzing the determinants  of companies'  deci-
sions regarding where  to incorporate. An empirical  study conducted by us
using  this approach indicates  that, contrary to the beliefs  of state  competi-
tion  supporters,  this  competition  provides  incentives  for  states  to  offer
1820 [Vol. 90:17752002]  ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE ON STATE COMPETITION
antitakeover protections.  States that amass antitakeover statutes fare better
both in retaining  in-state companies  and in attracting out-of-state  compa-
nies.  Indeed, there is scant evidence  that states with extreme  antitakeover
statutes, widely viewed as detrimental to shareholders, have been penalized
in the incorporation market.
Our  demonstration  that  the  view supportive  of state  competition  in
corporate  law (as  currently  structured)  does not have the empirical basis
believed to exist by  supporters has  significant policy implications.  It calls
for a reconsideration of established positions  on the merits of state compe-
tition and the role of federal law in this area. It also calls for a reassessment
of the body of corporate  law that has been produced by state competition.
In the  key areas  that  directly affect managers'  private  interests,  the rules
that have been produced by  state  competition  should not  be regarded  as
presumptively value-enhancing.
In particular,  our  analysis  questions whether  the extensive  takeover
protections currently afforded managers  in the United States  actually serve
shareholders'  interests. Contrary to prevailing beliefs, we have shown that
state competition does not reward moderation in takeover protection. The
proliferation of antitakeover  statutes  and protections  might have  been,  at
least partly, the product of incentives created by the incorporation market.
These  findings  lend  support to  proposals  for  federal  intervention  in the
takeover  area,  either  in  the  form  of mandatory  federal  takeover  rules,
which one of us supported  in an earlier work,"'  or in the form of "choice-
enhancing" intervention, which we introduced in subsequent joint works.119
In sum,  more  attention  needs  to be  paid  to the possibility that state
competition  might produce  adverse incentives  in some important  areas of
corporate  law. For this to happen, scholars of corporate law must first rec-
ognize that the empirical  evidence  does not rule  out this possibility. We
hope that this Article will help bring about such a recognition.
118.  See Bebchuk, supra note 2.
119.  See  Bebchuk  & Ferrell,  A  New  Approach, supra note  3;  Bebehuk  &  Ferrell,  Federal
Intervention, supra  note 3.
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